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Summary
Contemporary Japan, with its low birth rate and high life expectancy, is an aging society. 
Furthermore, the country’s population is set to rapidly decrease in the coming decades. For 
demographic reasons such as these, it is likely that Japan’s immigration of foreign workers will 
increase in the near future. Concerns have been voiced about the potential challenging 
consequences of a shift towards greater cultural diversity for a society with limited experience in 
the matter. While the presence of distinct minority groups is nothing new in Japan, the country does 
have relatively limited experience with foreign minorities (who currently constitute less than 2 
percent of the total population), and especially with tangibly different foreigners with cultures far 
removed from Japanese mainstream culture. 
This thesis attempts to shed light on the current situation of Japan’s tangibly different immigrants, 
as well as the difficulties and challenges they are experiencing, by exploring the case of Muslim 
immigrants. The findings pinpoint a number of specific policy changes that the Japanese 
government could undertake in order to potentially help improve the current situation of foreign 
minorities, as well as prepare the country for a future increase in immigrants. 
Underlying reasons for the status quo of Japan’s Muslim immigrants and immigration policies are 
explained in light of contemporary and historical discourses on the nation and ‘Others’. In-depth 
quality analyses of these discourses are conducted using the discourse-historical approach to 
discourse analysis, and the results illuminate potential obstacles to the development of future-
oriented immigration policies in Japan. Other findings include discoveries of historically rooted 
differences between Western European nations and Japan as hosts societies for Muslim immigrants. 
This suggests that for the future development of multiculturalism- and minority-oriented policies in 
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1.1 Introduction to topic
When I first visited Japan as a tourist in the spring of 2005, one aspect of the country that 
immediately fascinated me was how much everyone looked alike. Walking through the crowded 
streets of Tokyo, absolutely everyone around me appeared to have the same black hair and the 
‘typical Japanese looks’ the way I imagined them to be at the time. While this impression did 
correspond with the common Western image of Japan that I had grown up with, having the chance 
to personally observe the composition of people in the streets of Japan left an unexpectedly strong 
impression on me. The Japanese population’s apparent homogeneity in appearances stroke me as 
unusual when compared to my two home countries of Norway and Germany,1 and I started 
wondering why ethnic minorities seemed to be almost completely out of the picture in Japan.
 Little did I know back then that the majority of Japan’s ethnic minority citizens were in fact 
intangible foreigners, being either members of ethnic minority groups local to Japan - such as the 
burakumin, Japan’s former lower caste, or ainu and ryukyu, the indigenous people of Japan’s 
northern and southern frontiers, respectively - or foreign nationals born in, or with origins from, 
Asian neighbor countries such as China and (North or South) Korea. These minority groups all 
sported the looks that I at the time assumed to be ‘typical Japanese looks’.
 When I lived in Japan as a temporary citizen in the fall of 2006, studying Japanese, I became 
a tangibly different foreign resident myself. During this and additional future long-term stays, I not 
only learnt about the aforementioned intangible minority groups, but I also started to notice that 
Japan did indeed have a great variety of immigrants with physical characteristics notably different 
from that of the majority. Furthermore, I experienced that living as a white European in Japan, one 
apparently always will be assumed to be a short-term tourist, simply because that indeed is what the 
majority of white foreigners Japanese encounter are. I would always be met with surprise when 
people learned that I lived in Japan and spoke the Japanese language.
 I always suspected the situation would have to be rather different for those foreigners who 
neither resemble East Asians nor Westerners in their looks, and my curiosity about this type of 
foreigners gradually increased. Whenever one of them featured in a Japanese TV show speaking 
Japanese, the mere novelty of the scene deeply fascinated me. Whenever I saw one walking down 
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1 My father being Norwegian and my mother German, I grew up in both countries. Also holding dual nationality, I consider both to be my ‘native’ 
countries.
the streets of Kobe, or was served by one at a foreign cuisine restaurant in Osaka, I always 
wondered what the person’s story was. I wondered what it could be like to permanently live and 
work in Japan as an ‘obvious’ foreigner. For the past three years, I have read an extensive amount of 
books, articles, statistics, websites and other sources describing and explaining the situation of 
foreigners in Japan. While I still feel that I am only scratching the surface of this wide topic, I have 
through my strong personal interest developed an increasing understanding of the topic, which has 
allowed me to write this thesis.
Large-scale immigration of unskilled labor from countries outside East Asia did not occur in Japan 
until the 1980s. Until that point, the country’s only significant foreign minority had been the 
zainichi. Using Apichai Shipper’s (2008) definition, zainichi are “Japan-born foreigners”, mainly 
Koreans (but also some Chinese) who have lived in Japan for several generations without having 
become naturalized.2
 During what I choose to call Japan’s ‘First Wave’ of immigration influx, which took place in 
the 1980s and 1990s, during the peak of Japan’s post-war economic expansion, a period commonly 
referred to as Japan’s ‘bubble economy’ period, guest workers from various countries dubbed 
‘trainees’, as well as foreigners of Japanese descent mainly from South America dubbed nikkeijin, 
entered Japan to do blue collar work in the country’s flourishing industry. Using Shipper’s 
definition, nikkeijin are “second and third generation ‘Japanese’ who were born and raised abroad”, 
mainly Brazilians (but also some Peruvians).3 These two parallel inflows of foreign workers proved 
indispensable to the Japanese economy, as the country was suffering from significant labor shortage 
at the time, especially in certain blue collar positions. Yet, the government, whose official policy 
was (and still is) that Japan should only grant visas to skilled workers, never officially admitted to 
either of these two flows of foreigners being cases of ‘unskilled labor immigration’.
 In fact, only the nikkeijin were ever even officially considered to be immigrants, as the so-
called ‘trainees’ were only considered to be contemporary participating observers of Japanese 
industries - despite their hard work and limited ‘training’. The inflow of these two types of ‘legal’ 
immigrants also coincided with large-scale immigration of ‘illegal’ immigrants, who easily found 
work in companies struggling to recruit unskilled labor. These three types of immigrants have since 
settled down in the country, but increasingly restrictive immigration policies combined with the 
burst of the bubble economy and a prolonged period of economic downturn has in recent years 
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2 Apichai W. Shipper, Fighting for Foreigners (Cornell University Press, 2008), 29.
3 Ibid., 37.
severely limited the immigrant inflow into Japan. While a number of foreigners still enter the 
country every year, the immigration atmosphere of the First Wave is yet to find its match.
 It appears this will not be the last major wave of immigration, however: For reasons I will 
elaborate on in Chapter 2, I believe we are likely to see a Second Wave of immigration influx 
within the next few decades. This time around, the reasons for the foreigners’ entry is likely to be 
different: Rather than solving problems of labor shortage caused by a flourishing economy, the next 
wave of immigrants are needed to solve labor shortage problems related to Japan’s current 
demographic issues, which are causing the size of the working age population to rapidly sink to 
drastic lows. 
 Contemporary Japan is arguably in great need of increased immigration. The country is 
unlikely to be able to continue officially supporting nothing but immigration of foreigners 'close to 
themselves', such as the nikkeijin. The official introduction of completely new kinds of foreigners as 
new citizens in Japan may by now only be a matter of time. These new immigrants are likely to 
come from an increasingly diverse number of countries. But is Japan prepared for these new 
immigrants? How well does the country manage to include tangibly different immigrants, with 
cultures far removed from Japanese mainstream culture, into society?
1.2 Research hypothesis and question
Hypothesis: Japan will soon turn to official government-supported unskilled labor migration, 
initiating a new wave of immigration. These new immigrants will come from a diverse number of 
countries.
If this hypothesis should prove to be correct, the country’s population of tangibly different 
immigrants with cultures far removed from Japanese mainstream culture is likely to experience a 
significant growth.
Main research question: 
If we look at the situation of Japan’s current tangibly different immigrants, and the difficulties and 
challenges they are experiencing, through the case of Muslim immigrants, what observations can be 
made that could potentially help improve their current situation, as well as prepare Japan for a 
future increase in immigrants? What possible underlying reasons for these difficulties and 
challenges can be found?
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Among the different groups of tangibly different immigrants with cultures far removed from 
Japanese mainstream culture, I have chosen Muslim immigrants as the group that I will look closer 
at. Reasons for my choice will be explained in section 1.3.
Support research questions: 
To add a comparative perspective: In what way does the situation of the Muslim foreign minority in 
Japan differ from that of other minorities in Japan, and from that of Muslim foreign minorities in 
Western Europe? Also, what specific policy changes can be suggested for better accommodation of 
immigrant minorities in Japan?
1.3 Relevance of study and motivation
I believe that research on Japan’s ongoing shift into a society of greater cultural pluralism, and the 
implications of a larger immigrant population in Japan, is of major relevance today. The number of 
foreigners in Japan is expected to increase significantly in the coming decades, due to Japan’s 
demographic problems of low birth rate and high life expectancy. These reasons will be elaborated 
further in Chaper 2. My thesis attempts to shed light on how tangibly different immigrants with 
cultures far removed from Japanese mainstream culture have been introduced to Japan so far, and 
also gives us an idea on how they should be included into society the future. 
 There already exists an extensive amount of quality in-depth research on older minority and 
immigrant groups (see for example research by Sonya Ryang, Tessa Morris-Suzuki and Yasunori 
Fukuoka), but the existing research doesn’t sufficiently cover newer minority groups, especially 
those that are tangibly different immigrants, and whose cultures far removed from Japanese 
mainstream culture. Furthermore, it has not given enough attention to ‘newcomer’ groups of 
foreigners, e.g. labor migrants who arrived in Japan in the last three decades. Research on 
immigrant minorities typically rather focuses on minorities such as the zainichi, who are an 
‘oldcomer’ foreigner minority with a hundred-year long history in Japan, and whose country of 
origin is a close neighbour to Japan, meaning they both culturally and appearance-wise blend into 
Japanese society quite easily. Similarly, research on ‘newcomer’ foreigners typically focuses on 
nikkeijin, who might be from South America, but nonetheless are of Japanese descent.
 In order to fill what I perceive as a gap in the existing scholarship on Japan, I would like to 
look at the current situation of the country’s Muslims immigrant population. It is therefore my hope 
that my thesis could become a valuable contribution to research on contemporary Japanese society, 
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as research on ‘newcomer’ immigrants that are tangibly different immigrants, with cultures far 
removed from Japanese mainstream culture, does not sufficiently exist yet. In addition, my thesis 
will hopefully be of value to the research field of Muslims as an immigrant minority.
 Muslims have become central to scholarly and popular debate on multiculturalism in 
Western Europe, but the same cannot be said about the United States, where the number of Muslim 
immigrants remains relatively small, and the main cultural ‘others’ are Latino immigrants4. 
Similarly, one may not only argue that the size of Japan’s Muslim immigrant population, not likely 
to count much more than 60 0005 persons - a low number compared to the 680,5186 Chinese and 
578,4957 Korean nationals residing in Japan8 -  could be the explanation for the relatively limited 
debate on Muslims immigrants in Japan, but also that the quite limited presence of tangibly 
different immigrants with cultures far removed from Japanese mainstream culture is one of the 
reasons for the lack of debate on multiculturalism in general in Japan.
 As much seems to point toward an ever-increasing immigrant population in Japan, however, 
and with my arguments of Japan’s influx of Muslims in the late 1980s and early 1990s being likely 
to be only the beginning of an ever-growing group that will increase in size for every new period of 
guest workers imported who settle down, it is of major importance to start the scholarly debate on 
Muslims and multiculturalism in Japan as soon as possible. This debate is likely to only become 
increasingly relevant in the years to come, and it is my hope that this thesis will be able to make a 
useful contribution to the debate.
 Since existing research on Muslims as contemporary immigrants almost exclusively focuses 
on Western Europe, taking a look at the situation in a society like Japan could potentially provide a 
valuable source for comparison to that field of research. When discussing the situation of, and the 
images of, Muslim immigrants in Europe, researchers frequently point to the very long history of 
dichotomisation of Europe and Islam.9 Arguably, if it wasn’t for this dichotomisation, the very 
formation of ‘Europe’ as a concept would not even have been possible: Europe and Islam have 
historically been dichotomised to form an idea of the European contra the non-European. Between 
Japan and the Islamic World, however, no comparable dichotomisation has existed. Indeed, during 
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4 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Multiculturalism, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2010, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
multiculturalism/ (last accessed: May 9, 2011).
5 See details about the number of Muslims in Japan later in my thesis.
6 Japan Immigration Association, Zairyu Gaikokujin Tokei - Statistics on the foreigners registered in Japan (Tokyo, 2010).
7 Ibid.
8 Chinese and Koreans are Japan’s two largest foreign minority groups.
9 See for example Karin Creutz-Kämppi and Peter Holly, “The rhetoric of Europeanness”, 2009, http://bit.ly/iruANx (last accessed: May 9, 2011).
the height of the West’s imperialistic and colonialist activities at the turn of the 20th century, which 
coincided with the nationalist awakenings in Islamic countries and Japan, the natural 
dichotomisation was in both Muslim and Japanese eyes rather between the oppressive West and the 
threatened East.
 Researchers on Muslim immigrants in Europe frequently stress the influence of the belief in 
a Huntington-esque10 historic ‘battle’ of ‘civilisations’ between Europe and the Islamic World as an 
underlying contributor to today’s perception of Muslims, but Japan’s case is rather different. One 
should keep in mind that Japan and the Islamic World, at least up until World War Two, to some 
degree rather fought on the same side in the ‘battle’ of ‘civilisations’. Although Huntington’s post-
Cold War theory on the clash of civilisations imagined Islamic, Christian and Japanese cultures as 
three separate competing civilisations, arguably based on contemporary popular images, this has not 
always been the case, as I will illustrate in my chapter on the history of Japanese images of 
Muslims. (Chapter 4). While I personally am critical to Huntington’s theory, I also at the same time 
acknowledge its continuing impact on the discourse of intercultural relations.
 Contemporary global labor migration is predominantly a process of movement from poorer, 
marginalized areas of the world to wealthier areas, as labor migration usually is for economic 
reasons, and movement from the former to the latter can mean a significant raise in wages. Among 
‘newcomer’ immigrants that are tangibly different immigrants, with cultures far removed from 
Japanese mainstream culture, I have chosen to study Muslim immigrants because this group is 
heavily featured in Western European discourses on such topics as foreign minorities and 
multiculturalism, yet have not been discussed much in Japan. As any study attempting to discuss 
labor migration to Japan will naturally draw comparisons to labor migration to Europe,11 it should 
be useful to discuss a group in Japan whose Western European counterpart has already thoroughly 
been discussed. This would not only provide an excellent framework for comparisons of Japan’s 
and Europe’s contemporary immigration situations, but also of historical differences between 
Japan’s and Europe’s respective relationships to marginalized parts of the world.
 Past research on Muslims in Japan has generally been historical scholarship, or research on 
labor immigrants, or it has focused on Muslims as a religious minority. Historical studies on the 
relations between Japan and the Islamic World include such scholars as Japan historian Selçuk 
Esenbel of Bosphorus University and Islam Area Studies researcher Hideaki Sugita of the 
University of Tokyo. Notable works on labor immigrants include Hiroshi Komai’s Migrant workers 
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10 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
11 As Japan’s labor migration situation arguably much more closely resembles that of Europe than the situation of the US, Canada or Australia - three 
countries commonly cited as alternative models to the ‘European model’ of immigration. 
in Japan (1995), and more recently Apichai W. Shipper’s Fighting for Foreigners (2008).12 Both are 
about migrant workers in Japan in general, but both also make account of various aspect of the 
situation of such nationalities as Iranians, Bangladeshi, Indonesians and Pakistani. Furthermore, the 
compilation Transcultural Japan (2008) features an article by Onishi Akiko specifically focusing on 
identity and psychology issues among Muslim foreign workers.13
 Various scholars - including Michael Penn, Hiroshi Kojima, Yasunori Kawakami and Keiko 
Sakurai - have published a number of shorter articles on the contemporary living situation and 
demographics of Muslims as a religious minority group in Japan, in English as well as Japanese. 
Sakurai’s full volume on the topic, Nihon no Musurimu Shakai (2003) is the only recent publication 
of its kind, but it is unfortunately only available in Japanese.14 To my best knowledge, no studies so 
far have explored Muslims in Japan as a culturally and tangibly different minority group in the 
context of multiculturalism in Japan. Employing the knowledge from the invaluable past research of 
the above scholars, I attempt to contribute to the scholarship on Muslims in Japan by adding a new 
perspective.
1.4 Theory and definitions of central concepts
Before moving on with my thesis, I believe it first is necessary to clarify my use of certain central 
terms, as well as explaining major theories that I apply in my thesis. The terms ‘culture’, ‘ethnicity’ 
and ‘nationalism’ should be rigidly defined to avoid any risk of ambiguity in my thesis. 
Furthermore, the acculturation strategies of separation, integration, marginalization and 
assimilation, as well as the policy frameworks of segregation, the ‘melting pot’ and multiculturalism 
need to be explained, as surely far from all readers are familiar with these concepts.
Culture
Clifford J. Geertz in his work The Interpretation of Cultures (1973) argued that the concept of 
culture is a semiotic one, and that one therefore when interpreting culture should focus on the signs 
that human actions signal, and the importance of these actions.15 Illustrating how many different 
meanings the word ‘culture’ has, Geertz refers to the ten meanings Clyde Kluckhohn lists in Mirror 
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12  Shipper, Fighting for Foreigners.
13 Akiko Onishi, “Becoming a better muslim”, in Transcultural Japan, edited by David Blake Willis and Stephen Murphy-Shigematsu, 217-235 
(London & New York: Routledge 2008).
14 Keiko Sakurai, Nihon no Musurimu Shakai (Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho, 2003).
15 Clifford J. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books, 1973), as quoted in Miraglia, Law and Collins, What is Culture, Washington State 
University, May 26, 1999, http://www.wsu.edu/gened/learn-modules/top_culture/culture-definitions/geertz-text.html (last accessed: May 9, 2011)
for Man: "the total way of life of a people", "the social legacy the individual acquires from his 
group", "a way of thinking, feeling, and believing", "an abstraction from behavior", “a theory on the 
part of the anthropologist about the way in which a group of people in fact behave”, a "storehouse 
of pooled learning", "a set of standardized orientations to recurrent problems", "learned behavior", 
“a mechanism for the normative regulation of behavior”, "a set of techniques for adjusting both to 
the external environment and to other men", "a precipitate of history" and “a behavioral map, sieve, 
or matrix”.16 I consider all the above definitions quite useful for describing common meanings 
attached to the word culture. Nevertheless, my personal view of, and application of, the term 
‘culture’ most closely matches the second definition listed. Furthermore, my appliance of the term 
even more closely matches the social anthropologist Arne Martin Klausen’s definition of culture in 
Kultur - variasjon og sammenheng (1979):
 “[T]he ideas, values, rules and norms that are passed on to a human being from the previous generation, and that 
 one attempts to pass on the following generation - often in a sightly changed form”.17
 (Translated from Norwegian)
While Giulana B. Prato argues that in the field of anthropology, culture has traditionally been 
defined as a “set of rules, standards of behavior and values” (..) “which are shared and accepted as 
proper by the members of a society, or a specific social group”,18 Klausen offers a definition that is 
more individual-oriented. Not presupposing any consensus among entire societies or social groups, 
it rather suggests similarities that may be found within the same family line - and even admits to the 
unavoidable changes that are likely to take place between each successive generation.
 In light of my individual-oriented understanding of culture, I regard terms such as ‘national 
culture’ and ‘Japanese culture’ as not particularly useful, other than to describe vaguely defined, 
imagined concepts. The concept of ‘national culture’ always transforms following changes in 
historical circumstances, and can thus not only be described as imagined, but also fleeting. In 
addition, the imagining of the existence of a common national culture not only ignores the cultural 
variation found in the nation’s minority groups, but also overly essentializes the members of the 
nations’ majority group. In instances where a certain degree of essentialization of the majority is 
necessary for the sake of comparison, I will apply the sociological term “mainstream culture”19 to 
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16 Ibid.
17 Arne Martin Klausen, Kultur - variasjon og sammenheng (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1970), 10
18 Giuliana B. Prato, “Introduction - Beyond Multiculturalism: Anthropology at the Intersection Between the Local, the National and the Global”, in 
Beyond Multiculturalism, edited by Giuliana B. Prato, 1-19 (Farnham: Ashgate 2009), 3-4
19 See for example Jay Gabler, Sociology for Dummies (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2010), 91.
describe widespread norms, ideas, values, traditions and practices in Japan shared by the majority of 
the population.
 Baumann argues that the traditional view on culture in anthropology that Prato describes is 
essentialist, and suggests a new view of culture as a constantly changing entity that only exists in 
the act of being performed.20 While I agree that culture is constantly changing - and constantly 
interacting with, and mutually influencing, other cultures - I am critical to overlooking the 
consistency of cultural practices within the same family line. While I certainly do not believe a 
Pakistani family moving to a neighborhood in Japan holds a unique Pakistani national culture 
shared by all other Pakistani, nor a unique Muslim culture shared by all other believers of Islam, I 
do believe that each individual family members’ cultural practices are likely to differ more from 
their Japanese neighbor families’ practices than these surrounding Japanese families’ practices differ 
from each other. Therefore, I find “mainstream culture” to be a useful term.
 Regarding the ideas, values, rules and norms (henceforth: culture) of each individual member 
of Japan’s minority group of Muslim immigrants - passed on to him or her from his or her parents - 
to be likely to be greatly different from those of the majority in Japan, I think it is useful to describe 
these immigrants as individuals with ‘cultures far removed from Japanese mainstream culture’.
Ethnicity
Ethnic groups are by Hylland Eriksen’s (1993) definition groups that assume that they have 
different origins and regard themselves as more or less culturally different.21 The concept’s modern 
form derives from Fredrik Barth’s anthology Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (1969), where he 
described ethnicity as a category applied for the sake of contrast. For example, a Japanese 
individual may consider him- or herself as being of ‘Japanese ethnicity’ when contrasting him- or 
herself to for example Norwegians or Koreans. Thus, ethnicity is a concept describing a particular 
way of drawing boundaries between groups.
The acculturation strategies of separation, integration, marginalization and assimilation
Sam and Berry define acculturation as “the meeting of cultures and the resulting changes”.22 In their 
work The Cambridge handbook of acculturation psychology (2006), they list four different 
acculturation strategies that can be chosen by members of ethnic and/or cultural minority groups: 
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20 Baumann, as quoted in Prato, “Introduction - Beyond Multiculturalism”, 4.
21 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity And Nationalism (Pluto Press, 1993, new print from 2002).
22 David L. Sam and John W. Berry (ed), The Cambridge Handbook of Acculturation Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1.
separation, integration, marginalization and assimilation.23 They define ‘separation’ as when 
individuals place value on holding on to their original culture, and at the same time wish to avoid 
contact with the host society. ‘Integration’ is defined as having an interest in both maintaining one’s 
original culture, and seeking interaction with other cultural groups: In this strategy, cultural integrity 
is maintained, while participating as a part of a larger social network is placed importance upon as 
well. ‘Marginalization’ is defined as when, due to reasons such as discrimination, there is little 
interest or possibility in cultural maintenance as well as little interest in interacting with others.24 
The ‘assimilation’ strategy is defined as not wishing to maintain one’s cultural identity, and seeking 
interaction with the host culture.
 Contemporary studies of the assimilation of foreigners typically focuses on the case of the 
United States. Martellone describes it as a concept applied in the US of post-Darwinian times to 
replace the previous doctrine of Anglo-conformity.25 Assimilation incorporates organic theories on 
the “entity and individuality of nations” with origins “well before Darwin”, and “views nations as 
organisms”26. One can trace the origins of the thought of nations as organisms back to evolutionists 
like Herbert Spencer (1820 - 1983), who argued both have a regulative system (the central nervous 
system in the one, government in the other), a sustaining system (alimentation in the one case, 
industry in the other), and a distribution system (veins and arteries in the first; roads, telegraphs, 
etc., in the second).27 Martellone argues that the term assimilation gives connotations to ideas “of a 
living organism that assimilates elements that were initially external” absorbing these elements and 
making them its own. “If [it wasn’t able to do this], it would reject them, considering them as 
foreign objects, and even as lethal to its own biological balance”.28
Host society’s policies towards ethnic minority groups
Gordon distinguishes between two different types of assimilation: cultural and structural 
assimilation. The former corresponds with the type of acculturation process for immigrants 
described above, while the latter describes the process of society incorporating and integrating the 
immigrants and their descendants into its educational, political and occupational institutions, and 
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23 Sam and Berry, The Cambridge handbook of acculturation psychology, 35.
24 Ibid.
25 Anna Maria Martellone, “National Unity, Assimilation and Ethnic Diversity in the United States”, in Valeria Gennaro Lerda (ed), From ‘Melting 
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into the social institutions that allow for intimate relationships such as intermarriage.29 When 
discussing measures to include and integrate immigrants on a structural level, I will describe this 
process as “structural assimilation”.
 A society which finds itself host to ethnic or cultural minority groups may employ any of a 
number of different policy strategies when determining how to deal with this. Ignoring the extreme 
strategies of excluding or exterminating minority groups, there are three strategies well worth 
discussion: segregation, the ‘melting pot‘ and multiculturalism. Sam and Berry describe the strategy  
of ‘segregation‘ as one where “ethnic differences are allowed, but kept out of participation in the 
life of the larger society”,30 and the ‘melting pot’ and multiculturalism as two types of societies 
allowing the minorities to participate in society.
 In the former, there is a single dominant or mainstream society, with minority groups on its 
margins. In order to move from the margins into society, the groups need to assimilate, in other 
words ‘disappear’. In the latter, a mosaic of ethnic and/or cultural groups hold different cultural 
identities, while sharing some (flexible) norms with the larger society, like how to live together.31 
The policy choice of the ‘melting pot’ society has strong links to the individual acculturation 
strategy of assimilation, and is to some degree also linked to integration. The policy choice of the 
multicultural society, on the other hand, is in theory able to accommodate individuals choosing 
assimilation as well as integration and separation strategies. Being a complex concept, 
multiculturalism is in need of further elaboration.
Multiculturalism in detail
The origins of multiculturalism can be traced back to the abolishment of the evolutionist stance of 
regarding some cultures as more worth than others, and the introduction of cultural relativism, in 
the aftermath of World War Two and Western colonialism. Essential to this aforementioned 
abolishment was Franz Boas (1858 - 1942) - the pioneer of modern anthropology, who rejected 
evolutionary classifications of cultures and insisted they should be studied from a neutral point of 
view without ethnocentric value judgements. His students further developed the idea, and ultimately 
anthropologists embraced cultural relativism.32
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 Moreover, justification for multiculturalism can be linked to communitarian critique of 
liberalism. Simply put, communitarians reject the idea that the value of social goods can be reduced 
to their contribution to individual well-being. They regard diverse cultural identities and languages 
as social goods, and of equal value, and therefore advocate special rights for minority cultural 
groups33. In political philosophy multiculturalism is the body of thought that deals with the proper 
way to respond to cultural and religious diversity.34 Central to this political body of thought stands 
the recognition and positive accommodation of group differences through ”group-differentiated 
rights”, to use Will Kymlicka’s term.35 These can be on the individual level: individuals being 
granted exemptions from laws due to religious beliefs, or being accommodated or assisted in 
matters where the majority does not need any assistance or accommodation. They can also be on the 
group level, where they among other things may encompass the rights of self-determination for 
collective matters for ethnic groups or minority nations.
 Although other disadvantaged groups also apply the term, most political philosophy theorists, 
when using the term multiculturalism, focus on immigrants who are religious minorities (such as 
Muslims in Western Europe), minority nations (such as the Basque country) and indigenous people 
(like ainu in Japan). Multicultural claims include a wide range of claims including religion, 
language, ethnicity, nationality and race, but these are lumped together under the umbrella term 
”culture”.36 When applying the term multiculturalism in my thesis, it will mainly be to describe this 
recognition and accommodation of the cultural claims and differences of foreign immigrant 
minorities.
 The degree of accommodation and toleration of cultural differences varies between 
multicultural states, and several different models of applied multiculturalism exist in the world 
today. The term can mean the advocacy of equal social rights to the various religious and ethnic 
groups in a nation state, but in its most egalitarian manifestations it can even mean doing this 
without promoting either of them as national ‘mainstream’ society, or promoting the values of either 
of them as a national standard. Also, depending on the model of multiculturalism, a state may even 
to some degree tolerate that each of these groups use their own languages, sometimes even in the 
public sphere.
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 Some of the world’s nation states pronounce several different languages as official state 
languages or national languages. The states of Australia, Chile, United States and the Vatican city 
have, as the only four states in the world, no de jura national language or state language, but they 
all have quite obvious de facto official languages. In today’s multicultural states, it seems like a 
lingua franca, or at least a highly limited number of lingua franca, is indeed needed to govern the 
polity. The pluralization of languages in use (and the accommodation of these) within the 
multicultural nation state seems to remain a point of controversy in multicultural societies.
Nationalism
Benedict Anderson in his work Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (1991) argued that the origins of nations can be explained as a part of the process of 
industrialization and modernization. In his view, nations developed as a necessary component of 
industrial society, though neither "economic interest, Liberalism, nor Enlightenment could, or did, 
create in themselves the kind, or shape, of imagined community" that nations turned into - it was 
the capitalist print media, he argues, who made it historically possible.37 
 The nation is an imagined community, he argues, because it is a social construction and 
because regardless of the inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each individual nation, the 
nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship. Ultimately, he defines the nation as 
"an imagined political community [that is] imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign"38. 
When applying the term ‘nationalism’ in my thesis, I am referring to a group of individuals’ strong 
identification with this type of imagined community.
1.5 Methodology
My methodology of choice for this thesis is a discourse-historical approach to discourse analysis. 
The term ‘discourse’ can been defined as “a group of ideas or patterned way of thinking which can 
be identified in textual and verbal communications, and can also be located in wider social 
structures”39. Producers of discourse may include sociologists, historians, politicians, journalists 
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and more40. Discourse analysis mainly concerns itself with critical analysis of the use of language 
and the reproduction of dominant ideologies in discourse.41
 Aims of critical discourse analysis include detecting discourses, linking texts (defined as 
specific and unique realizations of discourse) to discourses, and finding ‘typical‘ examples rather 
than cherry-picking unique instances.42 Critical discourse analysis is a useful method for exploring 
reasons for, and strategies of, marginalization of society’s minority groups. It attempts to unveil 
strategies of self- and other-representation, by analyzing “traits, characteristics, qualities and 
features” attributed to either, and exploring “by means of what arguments and argumentation 
schemes specific persons or social groups try to justify and legitimize the exclusion of others or 
inclusion of some”.43
 Agreeing with Michel Foucault’s view that discourse cannot be analyzed only in the present, 
since discourses’ power components and historical components create a tangled knot of shifting 
meanings, definitions, and interested parties over periods of time44, I have chosen to opt for a 
discourse-historical approach to discourse analysis. This allows my analysis of Japan’s discourses 
of current social phenomena to be contextually connected to the country’s complex and unique 
modern history.
 One of the aims of the discourse-historical approach is “to ‘demystify’ the hegemony of 
specific discourses by deciphering the ideologies that establish, perpetuate or fight dominance”, as 
well as critically analyzing “the language use of those in power who have the means and 
opportunities to improve conditions”. In my historical discourse analysis, I employ a large number 
of objects of analysis, including historical documents, television shows, websites and magazines, as 
well as discussions and statements by politicians, authorities, academics, representative of non-
governmental organizations and more. I attempt a contextualisation of these objects of analysis - 
within not only the historical, but also the national and transnational, social and political contexts of 
their production - followed by in-depth qualitative analyses.
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1.6 Language transcription and character usage
Name transcription
Whenever names are transcribed from Japanese, Korean and Chinese in this thesis, given names 
precede the family name, in accordance with Western practice. Although this differs from the way 
these names are used in the context of their original language, this method of transcription should 
reduce confusion and ensure consistency in my thesis. It also corresponds with the way many of 
these individuals choose to transcribe their own name when writing in Western languages.
Hepburn romanization
When transcribing words originally written in Japanese characters to the Latin alphabet, I romanize 
them in accordance with the Hepburn system. In the Hepburn system, long vowels are indicated by 
macrons - e.g., the Japanese long ‘o’ is written ‘ō’. Hepburn is based on English phonology, and 
widely used in English-language scholarship on Japan. English speakers unfamiliar with Japanese 
will typically pronounce words romanized in Hepburn more accurately than those romanized in the 
competing Kunrei-shiki, a system of romanization that is based on Japanese phonology and 
therefore arguably less suitable for readers who lack proficiency in the Japanese language.
Quotation marks and italics
Throughout my thesis, whenever I regard a concept as questionable in its nature, e.g. concepts such 
as ‘race’, ‘homogeneous’ societies etc., I distance myself from them with the use of single quotation 
marks. When I am directly quoting specific texts or persons, I employ double quotation marks. On 
any quasi-quotation or popular term that has no specific source, I will use single quotation marks. I 
write foreign words, such as masatsu or Gastarbeiter, using Italic font, and use double quotation 
marks in my translations or explanations of these words, e.g. “friction” or “guest worker”.
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2. Immigration and foreign residents in 
Japan
2.1 Greying of society: kōreika and shōshika
A major argument speaking for extensive acceptance of immigrants to Japan is the country’s current 
demographical problems of kōreika, “greying of society”, and shōshika, “declining birth rate”. 
Japan’s working-age population is expected to decrease by 70 percent from 2009 to 205045. Not 
only does Japan have a critically low birth rate, but the country also has one of the highest life 
expectancies in the world: In a 2009 CIA estimate, Japan’s life expectancy was ranked third in the 
world with an expectancy of 82.12 years.46 This causes a serious imbalance in birth and death rates.
 The American demographer Warren Thompson’s 1929 Demographic Transition model 
presented four different stages of birth and death rates that countries go through in their 
development. Stage one is that of the pre-industrial society, where both death and birth rates are 
high, securing balance. Stage two is that of a developing country, where better living conditions 
cause the death rates to drop, but birth rates don't drop correspondingly, causing imbalance and 
rapid population growth. Stage three is among other things marked by urbanization and a decrease 
in birth rate due to access to contraception, returning balance. In stage four, both death rates and 
birth rates are low, with fertility rates of 2.5 (children per female) or less, and the large group born 
during stage two constitutes an economic burden for the shrinking working population47. 
Contemporary scholars may argue that when applying this model to the world of today, a fifth stage, 
characterized by fertility rates below the replacement level (usually about 2.0) should be added. 
Japan can be described as currently being in this stage, along with Western European nations such 
as Germany and Italy. The US nonprofit organization Population Reference Bureau in 2010 
reported:
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 “Japan has a total fertility rate of 1.4 children per woman, and an elderly support ratio of 3 — the lowest in the 
 world, along with Germany and Italy. By 2050, Japan will have only 1 working-age adult for every elderly 
 person; Germany and Italy will each have 2”. 48 (Population Reference Bureau)
While 2050 may seem distant, the problem is expected to become more serious even sooner: 
Estimates warn that in 2025, almost 30 % of Japan's population will be 65 years or older. In this 
vision of 2025, there will then be only two people of working age (15-64) supporting every person 
of retirement age (65+).49 Potential negative economic consequences of shōshika and kōreika are 
numerous: For example, the domestic consumer market is likely to shrink, and small and medium-
sized enterprises are expected to increasingly struggle to survive, being dependent on cheap labor.
 Addionally, the working age population faces an increasing number of social challenges. 
Recent studies indicate there is an increase of Japanese male workers who are left with no other 
option but to quit their jobs in order to take care of their parents or wives.50 To take care of the 
elderly has in Japan traditionally been the task of the family, but this tradition has always 
presupposed the existence of a housewife in the household. With the increase in unmarried singles 
and working women, and in families getting smaller, this is no longer always the case. According to 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications data, in 1990 single men in their 40s and single 
men in their 50s made up 9.2 and 3.6 percent of the population respectively, while they in 2005 had 
doubled to 19.6 percent and tripled to 11.9 percent respectively.51 With an optimistic perspective, 
these numbers could potentially just indicate an increase in unmarried cohabitation in Japan, 
mirroring similar trends in Western European countries. Yet, that has so far not been confirmed to 
be the case.52
 Japan’s National Institute of Population and Security Research estimates that due to the 
falling birth rate, aging population, increase in people not marrying and other factors, in 2030 no 
less than 37.7 percent of households with people 65 or older will be single-person households.53 
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How can today’s workers in their 30s secure the care that they will need in their senior years? 
Turning to adoption is not an option to turn the shōshika trend, as Japan’s sinking birth rate by no 
means indicates any biological incapability to produce offspring, but rather changes in lifestyle. 
Young people (women in particular) becoming less interested in having multiple children is a 
common tendency in all modern industrialized societies once they reach a certain level of 
affluence54.
 The graveness of shōshika may sometimes be presented as a problem unique to Japan, but 
Japan’s birth rate is not very different from those of similar industrialized countries. Comparing 
Japan’s number of births per 1000 persons to European countries, it is as mentioned similar to those 
of both Germany and Italy.55 Even in a regional perspective, Japan’s birth rate is hardly unique: The 
CIA’s index of birth rates ranks not only Japan’s, but also Taiwan’s and South Korea’s birth rates 
among the world’s thirteen lowest.56 Arguably, the remarkable speed in which Japan’s population is 
shrinking is related to Japan’s combination of low birth rate and critically low immigration rate. 
Gabriele Vogt, Japan researcher at the University of Hamburg, argues that all three major 
demographic variables are “extreme” in Japan: Birth rate, life expectancy and migration flow.57
 All of the world’s industrialized countries experience declining birth rates as they reach high 
levels of development, and it appears unlikely that any of them should manage to completely turn 
the trend. It is safe to assume Japan, like all other industrialized nations, will continue to have a 
relatively low birth rate, and will fail to fully reverse the trend. Therefore, it can seem like Japan has 
no choice but to supplement efforts of slightly improving its birth rate with significant replacement 
migration. Yet, Japanese politicians show strong reluctance towards immigration as counter-
measure to the greying of society, for reasons that I will elaborate upon in the next chapter section.
 There are strong indications that one of the key ongoing challenges of Japan in the coming 
decades will be to tackle the problems of shōshika and kōreika. It is arguably not surprising that 
Japan is yet to find solutions, nor that the country until this point have been struggling to consider 
immigration as a counter-measure, as the whole issue only fairly recently has become an object for 
debate. However, Japan does need to reach some sort of productive conclusion soon, as the 
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demographic crisis is turning increasingly urgent. But what is Japan’s past experience with 
immigration? In the next section of this chapter, I will provide a brief chronological rundown of 
Japan’s post-war experience with immigration and foreign minorities.
2.2 Immigration and foreign minorities in post-war Japan
Kibe argues that despite the de facto existence of labor immigrants in the form of nikkeijin, trainees 
and ‘illegals’, Japan has had a de jura policy of ‘non-immigration’, and points to the fact that 
migration scholars therefore have regarded the country as an “anomaly” among industrialized 
nations58. What underlying historic factors contributed to the current state of “anomaly”?
1945 - 1952: The Empire dissolves
In the first half of the 20th century, Japan was an aggressive and expansionist empire. During this 
period, an increasing number of diaspora resided in what is now Japan: Some, like the Koreans, 
were colonial subjects who had moved to the ‘core’ of the Empire either voluntarily or through 
being solicited for forced labor, while others were political exiles who had escaped oppression in 
their home country and shared Japan’s radical political views. A number of Muslim diaspora also 
resided in Japan at this point, as the country’s political climate in the decades leading to war turned 
increasingly Islam-friendly, for reasons that i will elaborate further in Chapter 4 (where I will give 
an account of Japan’s pre-war relationship with the Islamic World). Few of the Muslim diaspora in 
Japan remained after the war, however: Some immigrated to Turkey, others to the United States.59
 Selçuk Esenbel of Bosphorus University argues that the Muslims who remained in Japan 
didn’t fit into the new post-war Japanese society, “which developed amnesia about its pre-war 
Asianist past”60. When the Japanese Empire was officially dissolved at the San Francisco peace 
treaty of 1952, all former colonial subjects of the Empire lost their citizenship. This set the stage for 
a nationality very closely linked to ethnicity. In a swift and rigorous rebranding effort, Japan went 
from being an ever-expanding multicultural empire to limiting the categories of ‘Japan’ and 
‘Japanese’ to only one strict area and ethnicity, respectively. This drastic change in Japan’s self-
image would eventually be of major influence to foreign minority discourse.
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 This differs greatly from the way the British Empire treated its former colonial subjects after 
decolonization. Britain arranged all former colonies into the British Commonwealth, an 
intergovernmental organization where each member state was to be considered equal. Furthermore, 
all former ‘British subjects’ were henceforth to be called ‘Commonwealth citizens’. To illustrate the 
significance of former colonial subjects enjoying Commonwealth citizenship, one can look at 1950s 
and 60s Britain, when considerable numbers of Caribbeans and residents of the Indian subcontinent 
took advantage of their Commonwealth citizenship and migrated to Britain.61 Work opportunities in 
the UK has made this modern extension of colonial citizenship a big advantage to these immigrants.
 The former colonial subjects of Japan received no such privileges: After being stripped of 
their Japanese nationality, they were simply to be regarded as foreign nationals. The Empire’s 
colonial subjects arguably never enjoyed proper citizenship in the first place, however, being 
registered on a different type of koseki (“family register”) than ‘ethnic Japanese’: The former were 
registered on gaichi (“overseas territories”) registers, the latter on naichi (inland) registers.62 From 
1952 the only existing type of koseki would be the one for ‘ethnic Japanese’, as the concept of 
gaichi officially ceased to exist. The former gaichi koseki registered citizens who for various 
reasons remained in Japan after the war were from now on foreign citizens. Either way, the year of 
1952 can be regarded as the beginning of Japan’s post-war experience with foreign minorities.
1950s through 1970s: Overpopulation, rural migration and urbanization
After regaining sovereignty in the peace treaty, Japan began its project of developing a new pacifist 
nation-state radically different from the Empire. Depriving former colonial subjects of their 
Japanese citizenship can be interpreted as a move to fully abandon the pre-war project of Japanizing 
East-Asians neighbor countries. The latter half of the 20th century would see Japan actively 
promoting itself as a ‘homogenous’ or ‘single-race’ nation. Traces of the country’s imperialist and 
multiethnic past were however not easy to ignore or erase: especially the approximately 600,000 
Koreans present in Japan were an obstacle to this rebranding of the nation.63 Thus, the Japanese 
government started contemplating a way to solve the ‘Korean problem’. These Koreans were by 
this point technically stateless, their home country having been divided into North and South Korea 
- neither of which the Japanese government would acknowledge as nations. In the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, the Japanese government actively promoted relocation of Koreans from Japan to the 
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new communist state of North Korea, disguising this solution to the ‘Korean problem’ as a 
humanitarian project to assist diaspora in returning ‘home’.64
 Japan struggled with an overabundance of people in the years 1945 to 1950, when 6.25 
million people stationed abroad during the war returned to Japan, and another 6.4 million children 
were born. The overpopulation prompted the Japanese government to promote emigration to South 
America as a counter-measure.65 While European countries were already highly dependent on mass 
immigration of workers in the 1950s and 60s, in Japan returning soldiers and rural migrants 
provided sufficient cheap labor.66 Comparing the Japan and Western Europe of the immediate post-
war years is difficult because the majority of Japan was still predominantly rural. Having no need 
for foreign labor, Japan’s ‘single-race’ policy could appear convincing to most people in this period.
 The government eventually gave up its strategy of sending all Koreans home, and diplomatic 
ties were reestablished between South Korea and Japan in 1965. Zainichi now gained the possibility 
to attain the new legal status of tokubetsu eijūsha - “special permanent resident”, finally 
establishing their status in Japanese society to some degree.67 But special permanent residency 
status did not qualify them for governmental jobs or voting rights, and they were still subject to 
discrimination from Japanese companies who refused to hire anyone but Japanese citizens.
 As migration from the countryside continued, three-quarters of Japan’s population lived in 
urban areas in 1970 - compared to one-third in 1950.68 With neither rural migrants nor war returnees 
available as cheap labor anymore, an inflow of foreign ‘trainees’ began in the late 1960s and early 
1970s - but no significant numbers yet. The late 70s saw the first large-scale entrance of foreigners, 
but only women, who came to work in the sex and entertainment industry.69 Summarizing Japan’s 
immigration history of the 1950s through the 1970s, one can say that the country had quite limited 
immigration in this period. It is however worth noting that this view only takes official immigration 
into account. Tessa Morris-Suzuki in a recent essay (2006) challenged the dominant view of Japan 
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not depending on immigration from the 1950s through the 1970s, casting light on what she 
describes as “undocumented immigration” in these first post-war decades70.
1980s: Entering the First Wave of immigration
In the 1980s, at the height of Japan's post-war economic expansion, the issue of labor supply 
became a serious problem, especially in small and medium-sized manufacturing companies, the 
construction industry and the service industry.71 While the demand for Japanese products was 
unstoppable, manufacturing companies found they couldn't complete their orders because of worker 
shortage, and also struggled with the rising value of the yen against the dollar, which made it hard 
to move production off-shore.72 Yet, Japan’s official policy was to only provide visas to skilled 
workers, and only for limited time periods.73 This had been Japan’s policy towards employment of 
foreigners from the very beginning: In the late Tokugawa period74 and the Meiji period, so-called 
oyatoi gaikokujin - “hired foreigners” were imported to assist Japan’s modernization. They were 
highly skilled professionals, but only considered to be advisors, and a temporary presence.75 This 
system remained in the 80s, through the principle of only accepting skilled foreigners, for expertise 
in areas where one could benefit from foreign knowledge. This policy did not correspond well with 
industry’s demand for unskilled labor. By this point, there was also a tendency of young Japanese 
being more highly educated than before, and thus increasingly unwilling to work in so-called ‘3K’ 
professions: kitanai, “dirty”; kiken, “dangerous”; and kitsui, “hard”. 
 Consequently, Japan finally entered its First Wave of labor immigration this decade, 30 years 
after Germany, France and the United Kingdom did.76 The government legally only provided work 
visas to skilled workers, but not only did a lot of skilled workers such as students, English teachers 
and businessmen77 seek opportunity in Japan's booming bubble economy, but masses of unskilled 
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workers also found jobs in factories and construction sites that experienced labor shortage and did 
not refrain from hiring workers without valid visas.78
 While the government officially did not want to support migration of foreign unskilled 
workers, they eventually did worked out a way to fill positions in the undermanned unskilled labor 
market without calling it ‘immigration’: The ‘trainee’ program was launched by the government in 
1981, and has since been a source of temporary legal immigrant workers, but also a cause of 
increase in ‘illegal’ immigrants. It has been revised several times, but in its present form, it gives 
foreigners the opportunity to enter Japan with the purpose of ‘technology transfer’, allowing them 
to be trained and later take up technical internships at Japanese companies for up to three years.79 
Arguably, it is in reality nothing but a ‘guest worker’ program in disguise. The number of trainees 
was in 2008 estimated to be about 150,000.80 Although technically only allowed to engage in 
activities to acquire technology, skills or knowledge, they in reality rarely receive 'training', and 
work in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs in industries that do not attract Japanese because of their 
‘3K’ status.81
 The 1980s saw the first new inflow of Muslims to Japan since the pre-1945 pro-Islam 
environment, as immigration included a considerable amount of laborers from Islamic countries.82 
Sakurai claims that there were 10,000 Muslims in Japan in the late 80s83. E. Farah however claims 
that there were as many as 30,000 Muslims in Japan in 1982.84 
1990: The new Immigration Law
Following the 1980s’ inflow of ‘illegal’ workers, in 1989 the policy of allowing citizens of Pakistan 
and Bangladesh temporary entry without visa was discontinued85, and the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) 
also revised the Immigration Law this year.86 (In 1992 visa-less entry was discontinued for Iranians 
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as well.87) The revised Immigration Law, which went into effect in 1990, made it very easy for 
‘ethnic Japanese’ abroad to migrate to Japan and work: All they needed was to locate their name on 
a pre-war koseki.88 This caused a major influx of South Americans of Japanese descent.
 The law has been criticized for being a racist ‘Japanese Only’ policy: The South American 
Japanese who entered Japan this way might be unskilled workers, but Japan instantly allowed them 
entry while denying visas to unskilled worker immigrants of other ‘races’ from the same region. 
Shipper argues that the MOJ ranks nikkeijin higher than other immigrants by “racial-descent 
criteria” because of a “belief in racial dominance”.89 However, Harumi Befu has argued90 that the 
intention of the revised law actually was to facilitate the return of the approximately 10,000 
Japanese children and wives were left behind when Japan moved out of Manchuria in 1958.91 
10,000 is a relatively small number, and it can indeed be argued that the government simply did not 
expect hundreds of thousands of South American Japanese to take advantage of the revised law. 
This casts doubt to the assumption that the Japanese government was introducing a racial ordering 
to their immigration policies.
 Japan’s citizenship principle is jus sanguinis, nationality based on the ‘blood’ one is born 
with, rather than jus soli, nationality based on the territory one is born in.92 In countries like the UK 
and the US, a child becomes a national of that nation when born in the nation to two foreign 
nationals, but in Japan this is not the case.93 The Japanese Nationality Law has been based on blood 
line, ever since it came into effect in the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the revised 1990 
version arguably just introduced further elements of blood line ideas. With its new Immigration 
Law, Japan to a certain degree followed the policies of Germany and Israel, who in a similar fashion 
make it easier for those of ‘German’ or ‘Jewish’ heritage to immigrate. But since Germany and 
Israel provide full citizenship to these ‘returnees’, and Japan only provides them the status of 
teijūsha - “long-term residents”, the Japanese version of the policy can be viewed as a moderate 
one. South Korea has a similar system to Japan, prioritizing overseas Koreans expatriates. In certain 
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cases, they grant grant returnees nationality, but unlike in Germany and Israel there is no guarantee 
for this.94 Moreover, since a 2010 revision of the Korean nationality law, a very limited number of 
people are even allowed dual citizenship.95
2000: The ‘wake-up call’
In 2000, kōreika and shōshika’s relation to immigration became a topic of debate in Japan, as the 
United Nations published a report on “the international migration that a country would need to 
prevent population decline and population aging resulting from low fertility and mortality rates”.96 
The report found population decline to be inevitable in the absence of ‘replacement migration’, and 
stated that while fertility may see an upswing in coming decades, few believe it will be major 
enough to reach replacement level.97 Presenting various scenarios of immigration between the 
present and 2050, as well their results, it suggested replacement migration to Japan, but emphasized 
that it would require quite unlikely numbers if it should be the as the sole solution to the greying of 
Japanese society. According to the report, to avoid a decrease in population, Japan would need 17 
million immigrants up to the year 2050 - an average of 381,000 immigrants per year between 2005 
and 2050. Furthermore, to also keep 1995’s ratio (4.8) of working-age population to retired-age 
population by 2050, no less than 553 million immigrants would be needed 1995 through 2050 - an 
average of 10 million immigrants per year.98 
 While the UN report made big headlines at the time, and had impact on policy documents and 
academic writings, it merely acted as an “unwelcome wake-up call, not a serious policy 
direction”99, as academics as well as politicians considered replacement migration a too unrealistic 
option. Not all sectors of Japanese society showed the same reluctancy, however: The powerful 
Nippon Keidanren (“Japan Business Federation”) in 2003, 2004 and 2007 released official papers 
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urging the government to accept non-Japanese workers in a greater scale.100 In the 2007 edition, it 
was stated that it is “essential” to “admit more foreign workers”.101
 Politicians skeptical to large-scale immigration commonly express fear that masatsu (friction) 
between different cultures will pose a threat to society. It appears taboo-ridden to speak of 
immigration as solution to shōshika, and vague ideas such as automatization of societ102 and the 
introduction of robots103 are more common. Former Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Prime 
Minister Shinzō Abe in his book Utsukushii Kuni He (“Towards a Beautiful Country”) expressed 
that he believed the future solution to shōshika will be changes in the pension system and 
advancement in medication for elders.104 Various opinions on the immigration framework exist 
among academics, economic federations, government ministries and non-governmental 
organizations, but almost none of them consider immigration as a counter-measure to shōshika.105 
Consensus exists on the continuation of migration, but not on what sort of migrant workers, in what 
sort of occupations, and under what conditions.106
 Hidenori Sakanaka, former director of the Tokyo Immigration Bureau, and MOJ official 
from 1970 to 2005, claims that “the native Japanese have lived as a single ethnic group for nearly 
1000 years and it will be a difficult task for them to build friendly relationships with other ethnic 
groups”107, but stresses that the time has come to make a decision in regards to Japan’s future 
immigration policies, and personally does not appear to see any other option for the country’s future 
than a steady yearly increase in the number of foreigners:
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 “During the Meiji Restoration108 [...] fierce debate on whether to exclude or welcome foreigners divided the 
 population. As Japan now faces another period of sweeping social change, the country must again profoundly 
 discuss its future.”109 (Hidenori Sakanaka)
Japan’s economy needs immigrants, but the government continues to be reluctant, while the 
graveness of shoushika and koureika is intensifying. Japan’s population is currently 127,370,000110 
and falling, a quite unique situation considering it had been constantly growing from just 33 million 
in 1870 to its peak of 127,417,000 in 2005111 - the first year that Japan experienced more deaths 
than births or immigrations.112 2005 was also the year that Japan’s number of registered foreigners 
reached the two million mark, at 2,011,555 - a record 1.57 percent of Japan’s total population.113
2.3 An overview of Japan’s contemporary foreign residents
There are currently no more than 2,186,121 registered foreigners in Japan, meaning they constitute 
only 1.71 percent of Japans total population.114 Furthermore, a large part are what is commonly 
referred to as ‘oldcomer’ immigrants, like zainichi, a majority of whom were born in Japan. 77.3 % 
of registered foreigners are originally from Asia, 15.6 % from South America, and different regions 
of the world make up the final 7.2 %. Currently, the majority of the registered foreigners from both 
Asia and South America, who together constitute 92.9 % of Japans foreigners, are eijūsha - 
“permanent residents” (among them, some are special permanent residents).115
 Drastically increasing the number of foreigners to combat the challenges of kōreika and 
shōshika would be a big change for Japan, a country which does not only have a relatively limited 
history of immigration, but also has been developing policies to restrict rather than to encourage 
immigration into the country, and in addition has one of the lowest foreign population percentages 
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among the world’s industrialized nations.116 Still, from 1980 to 2008 the number of registered 
foreigners in Japan increased every single year, foreigners making up 0.67 % of Japan’s population 
in 1980, to the peak of 1.74 percent in 2008.117 Since this peak, one has seen a decrease, as the 
number of foreigners decreased by 31 305 from 2008 to 2009 - despite the UN’s estimates of 
hundres of thousands additional immigrants needed to be introduced every year.118
 Although it arguably seems unlikely that Japan anytime soon will reach a number of yearly 
accepted entrants of that magnitude (see chaper 2.1), the current labor shortage does cause an 
expectancy of foreigners in Japan increasing.119 Onishi argues that these new immigrants are 
expected to come from an increasingly diverse number of countries, and their purposes and reasons 
for coming are expected to become increasingly diverse as well.120 The most recent edition of the 
MOJ’s Basic Plan For Immigration Control (March 2010) stresses the upcoming growth of Japan’s 
foreign population, and that their activities currently are “becoming more diversified and with a 
growing trend of foreign nationals settling down in Japan”.121 New foreigners are frequently dubbed 
‘newcomers’.
Oldcomers and newcomers
The term ‘oldcomers’ generally refers to zainichi Koreans,122 and more specifically to residents 
holding the status of ‘special permanent residents’ (see section 2.2). Koreans were the largest 
foreign minority group in Japan throughout the 20th century.123 Second- and third-generation 
zanichi are known to have in many cases less attachment to their home country, and be fluent in the 
Japanese language, which often essentially is their mother tongue. ‘Newcomer’ foreign workers are 
usually either nikkeijin who arrived since 1990, trainees expected to stay in Japan for a limited time, 
or workers who entered Japan illegally or have overstayed the visa granted to them.
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Types of ‘newcomer’ immigrants in detail I: Unskilled labor immigrants
Among unskilled workers, the biggest group is the Chinese. But since the 1980s, new groups of 
immigrant workers from Asian countries outside East Asia, like Muslims from countries such as 
Indonesia, Iran, Bangladesh and Pakistan, have been introduced as well. These unskilled workers 
typically work in Japan’s industry, and usually in dying sectors.124 Foreign unskilled workers of 
non-Japanese descent usually first come to Japan on limited-period visas for a number of different 
reasons, such as language teaching, art, religion, research, studying abroad at Japanese schools or 
universities, or attending trainee programs at Japanese companies.125 When their visas expire, they 
voluntarily return home, are forced home, or overstay their visas, living as “illegals”.
 Newcomer immigrants may apply for long-term residency or permanent residency, but the 
latter requires the applicant to have lived for a period in Japan, usually for ten years, and its 
granting is to the MOJ’s discretion.126 Per MOJ statistics, there are 78,488 ‘illegal’ immigrants in 
Japan as of January 2011 - a relatively low number if compared to five years ago, when it was 
193,745.127 Foreigners found to be overstaying their visa are deported. Rare exceptions include 
instances when the MOJ discovered parents who had stable jobs and children who didn’t speak 
their native languages and were performing well in the Japanese school system.128
 
Types of ‘newcomer’ immigrants in detail II: Female-dominated immigrant groups
Another major group of immigrants are the women from various Asian countries (such as China, 
South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand) commonly dubbed ‘marriage migrants’.129 In order to 
acknowledge their actual work and invaluable contribution to Japanese society, I like to refer to 
them as ‘unpaid’ worker immigrants. They typically come to the Japanese countryside to marry 
single agriculture workers, and certainly do their load of work on the farm, not to mention domestic 
work and the raising of children, but per official statistics they are not worker immigrants. 
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 While some Japanese demographers argue that the shrinking of the Japanese population will 
open up more space, and make more land available for farming,130 younger generations, especially 
females, are moving away from the countryside. Not wanting to take care of the family of a farmer 
husband in difficult rural conditions, females ‘escape’ to urban areas. Male farmers’ consequential 
struggle in finding spouses, and their tendency to ‘import’ spouses from abroad, is a situation 
recognized by Japanese officials: Municipal governments in afflicted areas have resorted to official 
countermeasures by arranging meetings with foreign women.131 These wives hold the status of 
nihonjin no haigūsha, or “spouses of Japanese nationals”, and their numbers are growing steadily: 
one out of eighteen marriages in Japan are to a foreign spouse, and 80 percent of these involve a 
Japanese man and a foreign woman.132 Another category of immigrants where women constitute the 
vast majority are those entering the country with kougyō, or “entertainment”, visa. The majority of 
the women in this category work as hostesses, where the work may involve prostitution.133 
 
Types of newcomer immigrants in detail III: Refugees
Among newcomer immigrants, there are next to no refugees, the reason being that Japan hardly 
accepts any: Between 1990 and 1999, Japan accepted only 49 refugees - a stunningly low number 
when compared to countries such as Germany and Canada, who accepted more than 100,000 
refugees each in the same period.134 Although Japan ratified the UN’s Refugee Convention in 1982, 
by 2008 only 330 out of  3,544 total applicants had been accepted.135 In a regional context, 
however, these figures are less stunning: South Korea’s acceptance of refugees is equally low, the 
only exception being North Koreans. As the South Korean government allows North Koreans entry 
on humanitarian grounds, their numbers are increasing yearly. In 2009, no less than 2,297 North 
Koreans fled to the south.136 The Japanese counterpart in the context of refugee acceptance is 
Myanmar: since 1998 a significant number of Burmese political asylum seekers have been 
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accepted, with 117 authorized in the period, and another 139 given special permission to stay.137 
Accepted refugees, just like nikkeijin, enter Japan on long-term resident status.138
Final chapter notes
As demonstrated in this chapter section, there is great variety among Japan’s newcomer foreigners. 
These new immigrants currently seem to generally be perceived by the Japanese as only temporary 
guests. However, the ‘oldcomer’ zainichi were perceived the same way for a long time as well. 
Even after the Second World War, the general consensus among Japanese politicians was that the 
zanichi Koreans were a temporary existence, and that the goal should be to return them ‘home’. But 
today, it is clear that the group did become quite permanent. Will today’s ‘newcomers’ eventually 
reach the same level of permanency? If the ‘newcomer’ Muslims do choose to stay the same way 
zainichi did, what potential do these first-generation immigrants, and the emerging second-
generation, have for leading peaceful and satisfactory lives as members of Japanese society? Going 
forward, I will take a closer look at the current situation of the ‘newcomer’ group foreign Muslims.
3. Situation of Muslims in Japan today 
3.1 An overview of Japan’s current foreign Muslim population
Muslim immigrants currently living in Japan are a relatively new group: The majority immigrated 
in the late 80s and early 90s, mainly for economic reasons.139 During a period when Japan had visa 
waiver agreements with several Islamic countries and the economy was in dire need of laborers, 
they typically entered on short-term visas with the goal of doing blue collar work in Japan’s 
industrial sector. Even today, Japan does not support regular labor immigration of unskilled 
workers.140 Japan has also discontinued the visa waiver agreements it used to have with Islamic 
countries.
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Number of Muslims
The Japanese government does not keep any statistics on the number of Muslims in Japan, as their 
laws serve to keep religion private.141 Neither the papers filled out at immigration offices nor the 
papers filled out to receive the Alien Registration Card at local municipal offices require applicants 
to provide any information about religious beliefs.142 Neither does the national census. Japan is a 
highly secularized nation, comparable to France: Like in France, a country founded on the 
principles of laïcité (“separation of church and state”) and freedom of speech, the state does not 
keep statistics on its citizens’ religious, ethnic or political affiliations. This is not to say the Japanese 
government doesn’t officially acknowledge the existence of Muslims in their country, however - a 
few mosques and Islamic associations have in fact been officially recognized by the government143.  
While statistics from the Japanese government are effectively nonexistent, statistics published by 
religious groups have shown to be unreliable and unrealistically high, at times claiming up to 
300,000 Muslims reside in Japan.144 Thankfully, more reliable estimations have been done by 
academic researchers unrelated to both religious groups and the government.
 Despite conditions making it nearly impossible to tally specific figures, in 2001 Sakurai made 
an elaborate estimation of the number of Muslims in Japan. First, she looked at the number of 
foreign nationals in Japan whose nationality was of one of the 57 member nations of the OIC 
(Organization of the Islamic Conference), assuming persons from those countries are very likely to 
be Muslim. Excluding short-term residents, they totaled in at 42,104.145 She argued her estimation 
was only an approximate number, admitting that one can neither assume all nationals of those 
countries to be Muslims, nor ignore the fact that some nations with Muslim populations are not 
members - including China and India, two nationalities well represented in Japan but not commonly 
associated with Islam. Adding an estimated number of Muslims who overstay their visas, she ended 
up with the approximate number 63,552 foreign Muslims living in Japan at her time of writing.146
 More recently, in 2006 Kojima estimated the total Muslim population using a similar 
method. He started with the number of registered foreigners in Japan and multiplied the registered 
foreigners from each nation by the reported proportion of Muslims in that nation, reaching an 
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estimated number of Muslims in Japan counting 58,587.147 In 2008, Akiko Onishi claimed that the 
number of people of Islamic faith in Japan was somewhere “between 70,000 and 100,000”, with 
“perhaps 10 percent” of these being Japanese citizens.148 The Japan Times in November 2010 
described the Muslim community of Japan as estimated to consist of “around 110,000 to 120,000” 
Muslims, with all but 10,000 of them being foreign, and emphasized the community as relatively 
small compared with those of the “United States, where 2.454 million reside, or Britain, with a 
community of 1.647 million Muslims”.149 I choose to rely on Sakurai and Kojima’s refined methods 
of estimation, and will therefore throughout my thesis be relying on an approximation of 60,000 
persons when referring to the population of foreign Muslims residing in Japan.
Countries of origin, age and employment
The grouping of foreign Muslims in Japan must take into account that the individuals that form the 
group constitute a variety of different nationalities and ethnicities from across the globe. From 
Southeast Asia, Indonesia is the most represented nationality, from South Asia (excluding India), 
the most represented are Bangladesh and Pakistan, from Central Asia and the Caucasus they are 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, from the Middle East they are Iran, Egypt and Turkey, and from Africa 
it is Nigeria.150
 Since Japan’s foreign Muslims originate from so many different countries, and also have other 
differentiating parameters such as ethnic and economic backgrounds, it can be difficult to discuss 
them as one group.151 Yet, certain nationalities have a dominating presence: Among foreign 
residents in Japan, the four biggest Muslim nationalities are Indonesian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and 
Iranian.152 These four can be described as Muslim nationalities due to the four countries’ 
overwhelming majority of Muslim citizens: Muslims account for 86.1 % of the population of 
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Indonesia, 95% of Pakistan, 89.5% of Bangladesh, and 98 % of Iran.153 Going forward, I will 
present detailed information about the registered foreigners of these nationalities.154
 Indonesians constitute the largest segment of foreign Muslims in Japan, with 25,546 
registered. The majority of them are high school graduates in their 20s or early 30s who came to 
Japan through trainee programs. Bangladeshis constitute the second-largest group, with 11,162 
persons.155 The majority of them are in their 30s or early 40s, and many originally came to Japan to 
pursue education, but gave up due to high costs and started working illegally. The majority are 
employed in manufacturing. Pakistanis are similar in number to those of Bangladeshi origin, 
totaling 10,295. The majority are in their 30s and 40s, and 
migrated abroad to escape unemployment and support their 
families.156 Pakistanis played an important 
role in the development of mosques in 
Japan, and today many are self-employed 
businessmen.157 Iranians do not total more 
than 5,018, and the majority are in their 40s.
172 They come from major cities, and mainly  
work in construction and small industries.173
 As a general rule for immigrants in 
Japan, paid unskilled workers are typically male, while 
other groups, such as ‘unpaid’ workers (‘marriage migrants’) are female-dominated. Immigrants 
from Muslim countries almost exclusively came to Japan to do unskilled labor, and thus are almost 
exclusively male. Chart A illustrates the male to female distribution among the aforementioned four 
nationalities in 2001 and 2009.158 As one can observe from the chart, males constitute the vast 
majority, but the male-to-female ratio in recent years has slightly evened out for all four 
nationalities, possibly suggesting a process of diversification.
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Naturalization
According to Sakurai, by the early 2000s the Muslim population had shrunk to less than half of 
what it had been at its peak in the early nineties, as the majority had returned home due to reasons 
such as the degeneration of the Japanese economy and strong sanctions against visa overstayers.159 
More recently, Tanada described Japan’s Muslim population as “currently experiencing a slight 
decline” and cites the reason as workers returning to their home countries due to the economic 
downturn.160 However, as described above, methods of counting Muslims in Japan are based on 
nationality rather than censuses inquiring religious faith.
 Current researchers do not seem to take naturalization into account when they discuss the 
decrease of foreign nationals from Muslim countries residing in Japan. Statistics on the number of 
naturalizations to Japanese nationality by foreign nationals are readily available on the MOJ’s 
website in the case of major foreign groups such as Chinese and Koreans, but data on nationals 
from Islamic countries is not offered. After e-mail correspondence with the MOJ, however, they 
were kind enough to provide me with data on my four nationalities of focus, which allowed me to 
compile Chart B.
 The Y axis displays the number of individuals granted naturalization, while the X axis 
provides individual annual numbers for each nationality as well as a combined annual number for 
all four target nations. As one can observe from this chart, there has throughout the last decade been 
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decade did not exceed 915 individuals, and as such the recent trend of naturalization should not be 
considered a hindrance for the legitimacy of the numbers presented in this chapter section.
3.2 Current trends in Japan’s Muslim population
Settling down, marrying and acquiring legal status
Many of those who came on short-term visas worked illegally for extended periods, until eventually 
acquiring a legal status by marrying Japanese nationals.161 Upon the acquisition of legal status, 
many went on to transition from manual worker to self-employed business men.162 These self-
employed workers operate businesses such as used-car dealerships and halal food stores.163 Listings 
of Pakistani businessmen show that the majority of them are employed in use car dealerships (374), 
the second most common occupation being trade of Halal food (67).164 In areas in with high 
concentration of foreigners, stores run by self-employed immigrants, along with restaurants and 
more, create an own economy of immigrants.165 Like other immigrants who came to Japan in the 
80s and 90s, an increasing number of Muslims are getting increasingly settled down in Japan, 
forming new households and raising new Japan-born generations.166 This second-generation is very 
young, most of them not even teenagers yet.167
Settling down: Muslim prayer facilities and associations
 As Muslim immigrants are settling down in Japan to a greater degree than before, one noticeable 
effect has been the increase of mosques in Japan. Few Muslim praying facilities existed in Japan 
when the number of visa overstayers from Iran, Bangladesh and Pakistan peaked in 1992, but after 
many of the more temporary immigrants returned home, the ones left largely consisted of Muslim 
residents serious about settling down permanently, and this triggered the interest for a larger number 
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of facilities. The fact that many Muslim immigrants were becoming self-employed also made it 
financially possible to gather the funds to develop these facilities.168
 There has been a considerable increase in mosques in recent years: According to Penn, there 
were more than 20 mosques in Japan in 2006169, according to Okai, at least 38 in 2007170, and 
according to Tanada around 60 in November 2010. Tanada estimated that in addition to these 
permanent (open throughout the year) mosques, over 100 musalla, or temporary locations for 
prayers and gatherings, exist.171 Furthermore, there are Muslim student associations at certain 
universities172, and several different publications for Muslims are released in Japan.173 In gathering 
places such as halal food shops and mosques, believers of various nationalities, ethnicities and 
mother tongues gather in a rather diverse environment. In the Nagoya Mosque, with its 
multinational clientele, English is the official language.174
 Besides being places of worships, mosques in Japan also take on the additional roles of places 
for gathering and exchanging information, for social or business gatherings, and ceremonies such as 
weddings or funerals, and some even provide overnight accommodations for weekend visitors. 
Buildings, factories and residences are often remodeled for use as mosques, which means they are 
hardly a clearly visible presence in Japan.175 While there are very few eye-catching mosques, one 
exception can be found in the Tokyo Mosque, also known as the Tokyo Camii, in the sprawling area 
of Shibuya. Built in Ottoman architectural style, the building was completed as early as 1938. 
According to statements by Tokyo Camii, 400 to 500 Muslims of various nationalities regularly 
attend Friday noon prayers.176
 Mosques are widespread and very actively used in Japan, but nevertheless halal food stores 
outnumber mosques, and are the only place where absolutely any Muslim of any sect, ethnicity or 
nationality are guaranteed to gather regardless of background.177 Having documented recent trends 
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in the foreign Muslim population of Japan, I will now move on to some of the problems they are 
experiencing, and describe the specific hardships they are facing in their host society.
 
3.3 Problems for foreign Muslim workers
Muslim immigrants from countries such as Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Iran, like other 
immigrants in Japan, face number of difficulties in Japanese society. While they are not subject to 
violence and vandalism like they are in some countries in Europe - as Japan is a country of very 
little physical violence it provides a relatively safe nation to live in for minority groups who could 
usually fear physical threats178 - they do struggle with discrimination and racism as well as 
misconceptions, stereotypes and prejudices held against them. Also, while I in the previous section 
described recent trends of many Muslim foreign workers becoming self-employed, the majority are 
still blue-collar workers in Japan’s industrial sector, with all the difficulties that encompasses.
Labor issues
Foreign residents in Japan are often subject to social security problems, housing problems, and 
more.179 Last but not least, their position in the labor market is troubled: Immigrants who come to 
work in Japan as ‘trainees’ through the official government ‘trainee’ program struggle with a 
number of basic rights. Japan annually imports approximately 90,000 ‘trainees’.180 Shipper 
describes their working conditions as “slave-like”, “working from 8:30 AM until midnight, being 
fined for bathroom breaks, having half of their pay being put into bank accounts they cannot access, 
and their passports taken away".181 Under such conditions, many of them give up their ‘training’ 
and find work as ‘illegal’ foreign workers, with wages usually twice as high as their ‘trainee’ 
allowance. Their status reduced to ‘illegal’ immigrant however, they lose even more rights.
 Ever since the introduction of the program in 1981, ‘trainees’ struggled extensively from not 
being protected by labor laws due to being legally considered ‘trainees’, not workers. Since the 
MOJ’s 2010 revision of the program, however, labor laws are finally to be applied to all ‘trainees’ 
from the very first year.182 This can be interpreted as a step towards the government admitting to the 
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trainee program being an official unskilled worker migration scheme. Also, the same year four 
Chinese ‘trainees’ were awarded more than ¥17 million in damages in a historic court case in 
Kumamoto Prefecture. The four’s working conditions had truly been “slave-like”, working from 
early morning to late evening with minimal pay and only two or three days off for four almost 
years.183 Although official ‘trainees’ are now protected by labor laws, and increasing focus seems to 
be put on their rights, the ‘illegal’ immigrants are still in the same unfortunate position as before.
 Most manual work performed by unskilled Muslim workers is technically not legal. When 
blue collar workers like Muslim immigrants are labeled as criminals by the authorities despite their 
contributions to society, a number of difficulties arise. First, they are frequently subject to human 
rights violations, but are not protected from them by law. Because of their status they cannot appeal 
these violations to government bodies, since all civil servants working there are required by law to 
report ‘illegal’ residents to the Immigration Bureau, who consequently deport them. Also, for the 
same reason, all undocumented foreigners working in dangerous "3K jobs" cannot benefit from the 
Worker’s Accident Compensation Insurance Law when injured at work.184
 Other problems they face due to their marginal status at their workplace includes receiving 
unfairly low wages compared to their Japanese counterparts, or not receiving wages at all185, as well 
as always being the first to be fired under layoffs.186 It is difficult for them to find work on their 
own, so they become reliant on brokers, who are organized and take unreasonable fees.187 
Recruitment of undocumented foreigners is turning increasingly sophisticated, with Japanese 
yakuza as well foreign crime syndicates involved.188 Komai argues that the situation for 
undocumented workers is even worse if they are easily detectible by looks.189 Those from countries 
like China can wander around in public less anxious, but those from countries like Iran, Pakistan 
and Bangladesh fear detection and deportation at all times because of their noticeability.
 A few of them have attempted to do something about their ‘illegal’ status. In 1999, a group of 
undocumented Iranian overstayers, after living almost ten years in Japan, successfully appealed to 
the Tokyo Immigration Office for permission to legally reside in the country. In 2000, some of them 
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had their wish granted, a first for immigrants without Japanese family.190 In 2009, another Iranian 
immigrant family appealed to the supreme court after the Tokyo Immigration Office had denied 
them visas and announced deportation, and the Tokyo High Court had rejected their request to 
terminate the deportation.191
 Various activist groups also criticize today’s situation. Many citizen groups are working 
towards improving living and working conditions for foreign residents, lobbying the government 
for a tabunka kyōsei shakai (“Society of Multicultural Coexistence”) and challenging current 
immigration policy framework.192 Since 2002, several labor unions especially for foreign workers 
have been established.193 From 2005 to 2010, the union Nambu Foreign Workers Caucus194 together 
with other groups arranged a yearly “March in March” demonstration to encourage the government 
to take their concerns seriously. In 2010’s successful event, around four hundred of participants 
demanded better working conditions and employment benefits for foreign residents, stressing their 
need for job security and health care.195 Participants also complained about the tendency of 
companies hiring foreigners as temporary workers, in a ‘use and discard’ fashion.196
3.4 Acculturation issues
Research indicates that foreign Muslim workers often, in their workplace or in society in general, 
feel pressured to suppress or discard their original culture, and assimilate to Japanese culture. 
Onishi describes Japan’s social context as “relatively monocultural”, with a “prevailing ideology of 
assimilation” . In her interviews with Muslim manual workers, she discovered that many of the 
interview subjects felt that they were being pressured to assimilate to Japanese culture, and that this 
was a requirement for acceptance in Japan.197
 The term assimilation evokes negative sentiments for many, as it is commonly associated with 
a top-down approach of forcing humans to change. Martellone, discussing assimilation in the 
United States, argues that it does not necessarily imply coercion - which is only ever needed during 
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times of national crisis, when the nation is in need of patriotism - but rather encompasses a 
spontaneous and “organic” result of a “long, slow process which occurs and perfects itself over a 
period of several generations”.198 While this may be true of the US, arguably the first country to 
experience the process of assimilation of foreign nationals in its modern form, the problem of 
assimilation pressure the way it is applied today in East Asian countries like Japan, but also certain 
European nations, is that the nation does not simply expect an intergenerational assimilation of its 
new citizens, but an intragenerational and arguably unrealistically rapid assimilation process. 
 Martellone furthermore criticizes judgmental views of assimilation in all its forms being 
nothing but domestic imperialism, considering the immigrants in many cases in the US themselves 
wished to “become Americans”.199 While this may be true, a strong desire to discard one’s own 
cultural identity in favor of an American one may be a symptom of unequal power relations, and 
unfavorable social status determined by cultural background. In other words, more than a voluntary 
decision out of personal preference, it may be a decision motivated by the experience of 
marginalization and discrimination in one’s new home country, or a feeling of inferiority connected 
to a deeper-laying notion of one’s culture being considered lower in a global hierarchy of cultures, 
triggering a desire to ascend upwards in this hierarchy.
 Comparing to Japan’s case, it indeed often is the case that Asian immigrants do desire to 
‘become Japanese’, and the assimilation in these cases doesn’t spring out of a top-down 
enforcement, but a voluntary effort. This is however a symptom of a tendency both within Japan, 
and in other Asian nations, to consider Japan’s culture ‘better’, or more ‘modern’ than other Asian 
cultures, only below Western cultures. In Japan, attitudes toward foreigners from less developed 
countries may often be more negative than those toward foreigners from Western industrially 
developed countries.200 In the countries that were subject to Japanese aggression or colonization 
during World War Two, one can sense a coexistence of two complexes: Inferiority complex towards 
Japan and victim’s complex.
 Michael Penn of The Shingetsu Institute for the Study of Japanese-Islamic Relations argues 
that an individual Muslim who “plays by the rules” - i.e. makes an effort to respect Japanese culture 
and learn the local language, “may do very well in Japan”201 - but that things might go wrong once 
he fails to do so. As one example, he tells the story of a manufacturing plant in Western Japan 
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where the boss fired a Filipino Muslim who had taken too many breaks to pray, as well as requested 
to do lighter work during the month of Ramadan. The same boss later employed a Turkish Muslim, 
but only after this new employee had made it clear that he was a secularized Muslim who did not 
pray every day or fast for Ramadan. Being fired for practicing religious beliefs would have been 
ground for a lawsuit in multicultural societies such as the United States, where religious 
discrimination is not accepted. In Japan, however, where “group-differentiated rights” are not 
developed in the same way, employers might very well fail to see why one employee should be 
granted more breaks than others. Penn describes this boss as having “inflexible Japanese cultural 
expectations”202 rather than prejudice.
 While Penn’s argument may be true in many cases, trying to find the general opinion of 
Japanese employers from one company boss is not very fruitful. In fact, Sakurai paints an entirely 
different picture. She argues that when a foreign Muslim workers asks his or her boss for 
permission to perform prayers during the workday, or to wear a veil at work, permission might very 
well be granted “because of being ‘a foreigner’” - while an ‘ethnic Japanese’ Muslim might be 
negatively perceived making these demands “despite being Japanese”.203 While in fact being 
religious duties of Islam, these activities are rather viewed as “foreign customs and culture” by 
Japanese employers,204 who are not legally required to allow their workers to pray, but often may do 
so out of courtesy.205 Arguably, as Japan prides itself on national cohesion through discourses of 
cultural homogeneity, the foreign ‘other‘ is also expected to have a number of deep-rooted cultural 
practices.
 Nevertheless, there is a clear tendency of blue collar immigrant Muslim workers feeling a 
pressure to assimilate to Japanese culture, in a way that white collar immigrants from the West do 
not. In trying to understanding the assimilation pressure that the Muslims in Onishi’s and Penn’s 
examples are facing, it may be argued that this might be related to Japanese mainstream society 
considering their cultures hierarchically below the Western and Japanese ones, commonly ranked as 
the first and second most ‘modern’ cultures respectively in Japanese modernity discourse (see also 
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  Assimilation pressure directed towards religious minorities does not always stem from 
employers or fellow citizens, as it also may be directed from the state: In some cases, state laws 
may actively place constraints on certain groups. There has recently been an upswing in these kinds 
of cases in Europe, such as the French state banning religious dress in public schools. For French 
female Muslim pupils wishing to wear hijab headscarves to school, the law is quite problematic, 
and a good example of rather harsh assimilation pressure from behalf of the state.206 
 In Japan however, it is not likely that such policies will be introduced in the near future. 
Assimilation pressure is likely to continue to stem from in-group members around them, including 
co-workers or employers, rather than from the state. But do the Muslims eventually assimilate? 
Onishi, employing Berry’s concept of four strategies for acculturation, in her qualitative study of 
Iranian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani foreign workers found that they chose assimilation, separation or 
marginalization, but never integration.207 Integration can be called a ‘median’ option, being neither 
assimilation nor blind preservation of the original identity.
 If continuing the path of expecting cultural assimilation from immigrants, Japan is in dire 
need of improving its “structural assimilation” of immigrants, to to use Gordon’s208 term. Complete 
cultural assimilation is however an unrealistic goal in the migration situation of the twenty-first 
century. Arguably, it is highly unlikely that the newcomer immigrants like Muslim workers will 
ever assimilate to mainstream culture to the degree that oldcomer ‘foreign’ minorities to Japan did - 
first the ryukyu and ainu, then colonial subjects like the zanichi - even if given the same amount of 
time. Not simply because newcomers like Muslims are culturally further from Japan, or more 
different in their looks and behavior, but because the era of their arrival in Japan is such a vastly 
different era, that offers a substantially different situation for immigrants, and opportunities for 
transnational identities.
Increasing ties to home country
In her qualitative research on Muslim immigrant workers in Japan, Onishi found that many of them 
developed a stronger Muslim identity or faith after having stayed in Japan for some time. She 
argues that they did this to regain some sense of control over their lives, and to relieve stress by 
leaving their destiny in the hands of God while just doing their best in an everyday life filled with 
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challenges such as prejudice and discrimination.209 She argues that when faced with discrimination 
and when failing to make Japanese friends, Muslim immigrants give up on becoming integrated, 
and turn to religion and/or stronger ties to their original country or culture. Recently there has also 
been a trend of male Muslim immigrants married to Japanese women sending their half-Japanese 
children ‘back’ to the Islamic world, for boarding school, so they can receive an Islamic education 
instead of the standard Japanese one.210 Many Pakistani families send their children to Pakistan to 
live with their grandparents and attend school there.211 This can in the same way be interpreted as 
reacting to failed acceptance in the host society with giving up on it and facing homewards again.
Long-Distance Nationalism and Transnational identities
Gross argues that in democratic multi-ethnic states, citizens carry at least two identities - universal 
and particular, the latter usually taking the form of ethnic identity.212 Similarly, citizens of modern 
multiethnic states may also hold two national identities, or strong ties to more than just one nation. 
This tendency can take various forms. One difference between Japan’s oldcomer immigrants and 
newcomer immigrants is that the latter in their initial stages of settlement in Japan have a much 
better chance of keeping strong two-way ties to their country of origin, and to some degree still be 
present - while physically existing in Japan.
 Many social scientists at the end of the 20th century noticed that due to the improvement in 
modern communication and transportation, immigrants developed bicultural identities rather than 
completely assimilating. Indeed, the development of ever faster and cheaper transportation, notably 
modern jet air travel, and modern communication - satellite television for once, and more recently 
the Internet and its endless possibilities (and constant advancement) for human interaction including 
two-way live video conferences, makes it much easier for today’s immigrants to be in constant and 
close contact with the people and society they left behind. Today’s immigrants can regularly 
participate “economically, politically, socially and emotionally”213 in their home society, and 
develop a personal identity that incorporates two home nations simultaneously.
 Benedict Anderson predicted this development in the chapter “Long-Distance nationalism” of 
his 1998 work Spectre of comparisons, arguing that while the world in modern time has steadily 
disintegrated with the formation of more and more new independent nation states in favor of vast 
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empires, it simultaneously also has become more and more integrated due to the advances of 
capitalism, and the rapid development of new means of transportation and communication since the 
1930s, including commercial aviation, radio, telephone, television and computers.214 While an 
increasing proportion of the world’s population lives marginalized in poverty, the wealthy core is 
closer to these poor than ever before215 - just a short plane ride away, or right in front of them on the 
TV or computer screen.  
 Anderson argues that the development of the multicultural capitalist nation state has 
transformed the meaning of citizenship, and the implications of possessing a certain country’s 
passport have changed substantially since their introduction as identity proofs: Nowadays, they 
don’t tell us much about loyalty, but simply about where their holders might be able to seek jobs216. 
In Anderson’s view, one can notice a trend of “ethnicization of political life in wealthy, 
postindustrial states”217 that is causing their wealthy residents to financially support political 
movements in their home countries, in what he dubs long-distance nationalism. Through today’s 
convenient means of communication, expatriates can keep much closer involvement with their 
home country, and sit “safely positioned in the First World”218 while influencing a country to which 
they do not pay taxes, and whose legal prosecution they do not need to fear. 
 The lack of “structural assimilation” of foreigners in Japan can potentially lead to seclusion 
from society and long-distance nationalism. Foreigners face problems participating in Japan’s 
political life, and reasons include lack of policies to actively integrate them into society, and 
institutional hindrances.219 As foreigners cannot vote or run for public office, and are unable to 
become members in local welfare or human rights commissions and more, the political focus of 
most immigrants and their associations turns to long-distance nationalism.220
 Looking at Japan’s oldest foreign minority, the situation of zainichi Koreans in is complicated 
both by discrimination and by long-distance nationalism. As with other foreign minorities in Japan, 
like unskilled labor immigrants, those who remain South or North Korean nationals face problems 
with lack of basic citizen rights, such as health care, equal education opportunities and the right to 
participate in the democratic process. The at times high loyalty to North Korea held by minority 
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parts of the zainichi Koreans in Japan has been a source for controversy in Japanese society. North 
Korean citizens of Japan, who typically have never set their foot inside the state of North Korea, 
and simply are descendants of Koreans who came to Japan during the colonial era and later decided 
on holding North Korean nationality upon the division of their home country into the two 
conflicting regimes, might send money contributions or other forms of contributions towards 
Pyongyang.
 A few Japan-born North Koreans visit Pyongyang through field trips if they’re enrolled to 
special North Korean ethnic high schools221, but only a few of them get the chance to experience 
this.222 In April 2010, former Minister of Justice Hiroshi Nakai of the DPJ stated that the Japan-born 
Korean students attending these Pyongyang-affiliated schools were brainwashed with classes on the 
North Korean ideologic concepts of juche (self-reliance) and songun (putting the military first).223 
Shipper mentions one such Japan-born North Korean as an example of Long-Distance Nationalism 
in Japan.224 The second-generation Japan-born Moo Se Kwang in 1974 assassinated South Korea’s 
first lady on North Korea’s behalf. It was claimed by the government of South Korea that the 
president himself was the intended target of the assassin, who they claimed had been trained by 
special North Korean agents in Japan. Shipper argues that many overseas Asians in Japan, and their 
ethnic associations, identify with the culture, ideology, and in many cases even the politics of an 
experienced or imagined home country, although the admits the example of Moo is an extreme case.
 While holding such extreme forms of loyalty towards North Korea is rather uncommon, it is 
not unusual for zainichi residents to feel close ties to their largely imagined home in the Korean 
Peninsula, due to discrimination in Japanese society. Until 1979, pensions were denied to Korean 
citizens by the Japanese state, but this was changed due to outside intervention in the form of Japan 
ratifying UN conventions obligating the state to remove the nationality clause from the national 
pension law.225 In 1987, the South Korea-affiliated zainichi Korean organization Mindan protested 
on what they saw as a contradiction between the lack of right to political representation and the 
obligation to pay taxes as residents of Japan.226 The Supreme Court in 1995 stated that local voting 
rights for foreigners did not violate the constitution. Still, long-term foreign residents, permanent 
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residents and special permanent residents currently do not have the right to suffrage or political 
representation in most prefectures.
 Foreign residents in Japan displaying allegiance to foreign nations, and participating in 
foreign politics, like some Pyongyang-linked zainichi do, is regarded a major concern by right-wing 
politicians. However, the same politicians also complain about how wrong it would be for foreign 
residents to be able to participate in domestic politics. When the ruling center-left DPJ in the spring 
of 2010 discussed their leniency towards submitting a bill to the Diet granting local election rights 
to foreign residents, the center-right opposition LDP protested furiously.227 Foreign residents’ 
possibilities to influence Japanese politics are extremely limited, as even donations made by foreign 
nationals to Japanese politicians are illegal - Something the public was reminded of in March 2011, 
when the discovery of a donation made by a zainichi Korean to foreign minister Maehara led to a 
major scandal and his resignation.228 The 72-year old woman has stated to the press that she didn’t 
know she was doing anything illegal, and this was money she by her own accord decided to 
donate.229 Having no way to influence Japanese politics, foreigners’ political involvement surely 
must turn elsewhere as a consequence?
 Either way, a high-level “structural assimilation” will make it unlikely that the descendants of 
immigrants will choose to maintain such tight bonds with a country they were not born in. Young 
descendants of Koreans in Japan generally feel a weak connection to Korea compared to their 
parents, not having close friends or relatives there. They attend Japanese schools, have Japanese 
friends, and participate in Japanese youth culture, and speak better Japanese than Korean - the latter 
of which some of them don’t have any proficiency in whatsoever. Yasunori Fukuoka’s qualitative 
research on young Koreans in Japan unveil a complex identity different from both Korean nationals 
in Korea and majority Japanese.230 Sakurai argues that because the second generation of Muslim 
immigrants in Japan - who are yet to become adults for quite a few more years - are unlikely to take 
collective action, being too ethnically and geographically divided.231 Growing up spread across 
Japan, and being part of a very weakly organized minority, issues of Long-Distance nationalism and 
radicalization among young Muslims in Japan is not likely to become a problem.
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 Even with more and more ways to maintain strong contact with one’s country of origin, and 
more frequent travels ‘back home’ to this country, new generations of immigrant descendants born 
on Japanese soil may still be likely to feel most of all connected to Japan, the country they grew up 
in and have the most social and emotional investment in. Arguably, by granting local election rights 
to foreign nationals in all prefectures, their political involvement is also unlikely to turn to 
radicalism or long-distance nationalism. By structurally assimilating these new generations of 
Japan-born minorities, and including them into all of society’s major institutions, not only will 
Japan surely experience new generations of minorities with strong ties to Japan, the country is also 
likely to experience a reduction of prejudice directed towards these minority groups.
3.5 The emerging underclass and need for changes in the 
educational system
Recently, cities with large settlements of foreigners are experiencing an unfortunate ever-increasing 
separation of foreign and Japanese nationals. Hamamatsu City in Shizuoka Prefecture has about 
30,000 foreign residents, out of the about 800,000 total residents. This makes for four percent of the 
total population, which is twice the national average. The number of them increased in particular 
with the inflow of nikkeijin starting in 1990. The Japan Times in the spring of 2010 reported that the 
city’s foreign residents live separated from ‘ethnic Japanese’, and their children are poorly 
integrated into society: With low Japanese language skills, only about half of them attend high 
school, causing a formation of what the article writer chooses to describe as “an alienated and 
undereducated underclass”.232 Education for migrant children is not compulsory in Japan, although 
it is currently being discussed.233
 On a positive note, the article describes the success of a non-profit organization, the 
Hamamatsu NPO Network Center, in motivating these immigrant children to go to school, as well 
as translating information handbooks to five different languages. The group has as of late started to 
become recognized by the prefectural government, and early 2010 it received the Japan 
Foundation’s Global Citizenship Award. Another Japan Times article cited Japan-born Kim Bung 
Ang of the Korea NGO Center, who pointed to schools in the US where Spanish or Portuguese is 
used alongside English, and suggested that areas in Japan with high concentration of Brazilian 
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nationals should have bilingual elementary and secondary schools teaching both Portuguese and 
Japanese - to Japanese as well as the nikkeijin children.234
 Martellone, discussing this recent US trend, views the “right to bilingualism” that for 
example Hispanics claim as a threat to the traditional concept of national unity based on common 
language and institutions, and imagines granting one ethnic group this privelege will make others 
follow.235 Activists like Kim meet many critical Japanese voices similar to Martellone’s in Japan, 
yet in 2004 the government officially recognized the first multilingual school for nikkeijin, Mundo 
de Alegria in Hamamatsu. The school offers education from elementary through high school, and 
graduates can go on to university education in Japan or Spanish or Portuguese speaking 
countries.236
 Sakurai considers it unlikely that Islamic ethnic schools could open for the children of 
Muslim immigrants: While Christian schools presently exist, and are even attended by non-
believing ‘ethnic Japanese’, Christianity is considered a cornerstone of the Western culture that 
Japan modeled itself after during its modernization process, while Islam on the other hand suffers 
from the image of a “backward” third world religion.237 Parents of Muslim schoolchildren have 
however showed dissatisfcation with Japanese public schools, and points of concern include the 
food served in school cafeterias as well as the joint physical education. Consequently, more affluent  
families actually send their children to the Christian schools, believing these are more likely to 
respect religion.238 Some Islamic groups have attemped to found Islamic schools, and the 
Indonesian and Iranian embassies have actually established schools for the children of nationals, 
providing teaching in accordance with their respective national eduction programs.239 Nevertheless, 
since Muslim immigrants are a small minority spread all across Japan, and a linguistically 
heterogenous group, it will in most cases be hard for them to send their children to schools designed 
especially for their needs.
 In order to avoid that their children will grow to “an alienated and undereducated 
underclass”, then, one must rather count on the public Japanese school system to develop policies 
that better accommodate immigrant children, such as additional and intensive language classes for 
Japanese as a foreign language. The experience and insight of organizations such as the Hamamatsu 
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NPO Network Center and the Korea NGO Center would be invaluable in the institutional 
development of a more multicultural Japan. They advocate what Kymlicka calls individual-level 
“group-differentiated rights”240, accommodation or assistance in matters where the majority does 
not need assistance or accommodation: being accommodated in schools or in voting by offering 
information in more languages, or receive funding for minority language schools and ethnic 
associations. Should the work and insight of such organizations be broadly acknowledged by 
politicians on both a regional and national level, and eventually used as a model or inspiration in the 
development of central-government policies, there should surely be opportunities for significantly 
improving the current situation of immigrants, as well as preventing the formation of ‘underclasses’ 
as Japan’s immigrant population continues to grow.
 Yet, in a 2001 survey, only 16 percent of Japanese respondents agreed to that Japan should 
grant visas to unskilled foreign workers241, and in late 2010, the think tank Japan Forum on 
International Relations submitted a report signed by 87 prominent politicians, scholars, business 
leaders and former diplomats to the government, advising the government not only against 
increasing any immigration but skilled worker immigration, but also against letting Japanese 
language instruction to foreigners become any major financial burden, suggesting one should rather 
make sure that the foreigners are proficient in Japanese before they enter country.242 The think tank 
expressed opposition to long-term residency for foreigners, and consequentially completely ignored 
the new challenges that occur when foreigners settle in Japan and raise their children in the country. 
As we can see in Hamamatsu’s case however, it has already become a reality. The government can 
choose to close it eyes to the reality and follow the think tank’s suggestion, or accept that the 
teaching of Japanese to new generations of Japan-born foreign residents is an expense that is an 
absolute necessity.
 Similarly, in Germany’s early years of accepting labor migration in the 1950s, the temporary 
‘guest’ workers, Gastarbeiter, and their children were expected to eventually return home. In fact, 
as each Gastarbeiter originally had to return home after two years, their Germany-born children 
were expected to become two years old at most, and debate advocating initiatives to ensure this 
second generation learnt the German language was consequentially non-existent.243 However, as 
these immigrants eventually settled down permanently after all, efforts to accommodate immigrant 
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children in schools began in the 1970s.244 In present-day Germany, the Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research has proposed ideas of ‘whole-day schools’ teaching immigrant children the 
German language thoroughly, in a way that schooldays of conventional length are not able to 
provide.245
  The aforementioned tendency of Muslim immigrants sending their children ‘back’ to the 
Islamic world to receive an Islamic education instead of the standard Japanese one, can on the one 
hand be interpreted as them reacting to failed inclusion into Japanese society by turning their backs 
to Japanese society. On the other hand, it can be interpreted as immigrants who once imagined 
themselves permanently settling down in Japan, start succumbing to Japanese politicians’ demand 
of ‘temporality’ once they have children. Professor Angelo Ishi at the Musahi University in Tokyo, 
third-generation Japanese-Brazilian born in Brazil and resident of Japan since 1990, in an interview 
with the Japan Times stated that many nikkeijin residents feel that they would like to return to Brazil 
eventually, “as they couldn’t secure a place where they truly feel at home in Japan”.246 If first-
generation immigrants still feel like guests and not temporary residents even after giving birth to 
second-generation immigrants on Japanese soil, do they simply not bother to have their children be 
raised with a Japanese education, expecting them to not lead their adult life in Japan anyway?
 The government arguably does not only need to accommodate immigrant children in their 
public schools, but they also needs to actively combat discrimination of minority groups, and 
change attitudes towards foreigners and other minorities, starting with campaigns in schools. In 
October 2010, the government learned the hard way that it is necessary, when a twelve year old 
schoolgirl in Gunma Prefecture committed suicide after a long period of bullying. The girl had for a 
long time been bullied by classmates for being half foreign, after a visit to the school by her mother 
from the Philippines.247 The following month, the government responded by having the education 
ministry conducting a nationwide survey of bullying in schools. Although this was a much needed 
undertaking, it is evident that the government also should focus on spreading positive attitudes 
towards immigrant groups and different cultural or ethnic groups in the school system, starting with 
elementary school. The education system should stop presenting children with images of a 
homogenous Japanese society, but rather prepare the next generation of Japanese for the future 
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multiethnic, multicultural Japan they will surely spend the majority of their lifetime in. 
Misconceptions and wrong images of immigrant minorities should be combated at an early point. 
Kim Bung Ang suggests: "Just like advocacy against smoking and the use of drugs, there should be 
more persistent campaigns against discrimination against foreigners".248
 Concerned about the amount of Internet slander directed towards foreigners, along the lines of 
“Koreans go home”, he argues one problem might be that the authors of these messages, like most 
Japanese, don’t really know the reasons for why Koreans initially came to Japan. More generally, he 
argues, one should spread awareness of why these foreigners are living in Japan - citing reasons 
such as poverty and historical circumstances - to reduce the chance of Japanese making such 
statements.249 An illuminating compulsary school course on minorities and foreigners should 
definitely also cover the reasons for migration, and put an end to what Kim describes as a Japanese 
attitude of likening the situation of foreigners in Japan with their own situation when traveling 
abroad. What Kim touches upon here is the Japanese tendency of looking at anything foreign as 
temporary, and in a situation of being guest - surely bound to soon return “home”. Indeed, this 
appears to be a widespread Japanese mentality: In the years I lived in Japan, just about every single 
time I, as a tangibly different foreigner, told a Japanese person that I was living in Japan, their 
follow-up question would be “itsu karerundesu ka?” (“when are you returning home”).
3.6 Muslim concern: Unbalanced image and prejudice
Immigrant Muslims in Japan, being a marginalized group, do not have a strong or visible voice in 
society to negotiate their social image. Looking at other minority groups in Japan, the burakumin 
(Japan’s former underclass caste) and zainichi for example are both well-represented by scholars as 
well as high-level politicians, but this is not the case for Muslims, which makes it hard for them to 
influence society’s images of them. Many Muslims even hide from society because of their ‘illegal’ 
status.
 One of the few arenas where they have a chance to convey an images of themselves to 
Japanese society is Japanese language Muslim websites. Isurāmu Bunka no Hōmupēji (Homepage 
of Islamic Culture), the allegedly first Japanese website on Islam, features to an introduction to 
religion of Islam, under the title of Isurāmu to wa (“What Islam is”).250 This introduction explains 
that the roots of the word Islam is the Arabian word for ‘peace’, but it can also have other meanings, 
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including obedience, meaning total obedience to Allah. The central teachings of Islam are described 
as being: to teach and preserve the teachings of Allah, Islam’s only God, respecting and loving Him 
and receive protection in return, to rid believers of fear and sorrow, to acquire “true peace” in both 
flesh and spirit, and for every individual to reach their maximum potential, and “enjoy unlimited 
fortune”.251 They go on to list the six articles of belief, and the rituals of Islam.
 The website hosts an article by the Islam scholar Shinya Makino, of Tokyo University of 
Foreign Studies, who tries to answer question of “why is Islam hard to understand for 
Japanese?”.252 His answer is that ‘Islam’ cannot be confined to a mere question of religious belief, 
but also encompasses rules close to everyday life such as of what one can eat and drink - deeply 
related to people’s lifestyles, and more broadly, their culture. How Islam is of such fundamental 
importance and influence to its believers lives is something that’s unusual and hard to grasp for 
Japanese, he argues. On an updated front page statement, Isurāmu Bunka no Hōmupēji argues that 
while Japan’s relationship to Islamic countries has been deepening, and the public’s awareness of 
Islam is raising thanks to good-written pieces of Islam in specialist magazines, as well as Islam 
being increasingly featured in mass media as well, understanding of Islam in Japan is still 
“unbalanced”.253 Through the content on Isurāmu Bunka no Hōmupēji, one can sense a concern 
about Japanese not understanding, or holding incorrect or imbalanced views and images of, and 
prejudices towards, Islam and its believers. What images do Japanese hold of Islam and muslims 
today? And are these images “unbalanced” - if so, why?
 Pettigrew argues that research on prejudice and discrimination produces different results on 
the individual/intergroup level and the cultural/structural level. On the former, anti-immigrant 
prejudice and discrimination hardly differs from general outgroup prejudice and discrimination, and 
this pattern is similar “from Australia and South Africa to North America and Europe”.254 On the 
latter, however, the prejudice and discrimination directed towards immigrants differs sharply 
compared to that directed towards other outgroups. He argues that not only laws, the employment 
situation, the speed of entry of the newcomers, the size of the immigrant group and prior history 
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with immigration are contributing factors, but also prior relationship with the immigrant group in 
question.255
 Looking at the situation of Muslim immigrants in contemporary Japan, then, we need not 
only need to understand Japan’s short history of immigration, and immigration laws (see section 
2.2), the size of its immigrant Muslim community (see section 3.1), and the problems such 
foreigners face in social arenas such as the labor market and more (see 3.3 through 3.6), but we also 
need to understand Japan’s prior relationship to the Islamic World, and Muslims as a group, and its 
views on them throughout modern history. Therefore, before taking a look at contemporary 
Japanese images of Muslims, I will first take a look at the history of Japanese-Islamic relations.
4. History of Japanese images of 
Muslims
4.1 Prior to the 20th century
First contact with the Islamic world prior to the Tokugawa Period
The first European ships arrived in Japan in 1543256,  and the early Portuguese and Spaniards 
frequenting the ports of Nagasaki brought with them influences Christianity and from nanban257 
culture (culture of the people of the Iberian peninsula).258 Sugita argues that introducing Europe as a 
new intermediary was an important event in the history of relations between Japan and the Middle 
East because until then, the relations between the two had been entirely through China. 
Furthermore, he points to the significant presence of believers of Islam on the Iberian peninsula 
until 1492 (being controlled by the Muslim moor people), and that Arab Islamic culture flourished 
on the majority of the peninsula for a long period. The Western merchants also introduced Japan to 
new goods259 with names originally stemming from Arabic.260
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Tokugawa Period’s images of the Middle East
The Japanese of the Tokugawa Period (1603 - 1868) gained a new view on world geography 
through a mix of information from China and Europe, and gradually deepened their knowledge of 
the Middle Eastern countries. Eventually information from the latter gradually expelled and 
surpassed the former.261 Newsletters of current world affairs presented to the Shogunate by Dutch 
merchants gave fairly detailed reports on current wars, civil wars and epidemics in Persia, the 
Ottoman Empire, the Arab peninsula and more.262 
 Hakuseki Arai and Joken Nishikawa’s works on world geography (released in 1709 and 1713 
respectively) were based on secondary sources,263 but nevertheless became milestones for Japan’s 
knowledge of the outside world.264 Both made detailed descriptions of Persia, and Nishikawa 
describes the country as featuring monarchic rule, people who in their looks resemble Indians, tall 
golden towers and more. The latter are possibly a reference to the Minaret spires of mosques265. 
Both scholars listed what goods the country produces,266 and these listed exotic goods were all 
available for purchased in Nagasaki at the time.267 Widely known goods with names such as “Persia 
leather”, “Persia horses” etc., spread awareness of the country to the greater public. Muslim moor 
merchants also frequented Nagasaki, doing business in Persian.268 
Meiji accounts of the Islamic World
The Meiji Period’s (1868 - 1912) early years were marked by a strong will to modernize and ‘catch 
up’ to Western civilization, regarded by the Japanese as the world’s most advanced civilization. 
Infatuation with all things Western and focus on modernization caused down-prioritization of the 
Islamic World. In the ‘Iwakura Mission’ of 1871 to 1873, Meiji oligarchs undertook a journey to 
various countries in the world.269 Besides diplomatic goals, the purpose of the journey was to gather 
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information that could be useful in Japan’s modernization. The Embassy’s crew initially counted 46 
people, but the number kept changing throughout the journey.270 One crew member, historian Kume 
Kunitake, kept a detailed travel log and eventually compiled a five-volume account of the 
journey,271 which provides an interesting insight to the Embassy’s impressions of, and attitudes 
towards, a number of  Islamic countries and their people.
 The Meiji oligarchs in the travel accounts express admiration for Egypt, but predominantly 
for aspects that Europe is responsible for. While deeply fascinated with the “immerse undertaking” 
of constructing the Suez canal, they emphasize this achievement being thanks to the French 
engineer de Lesseps, and describe the Egyptian laborers doing the digging as “backward”, 
“ignorant” and “unaccustomed to engineering work”, also stressing the fact that Egypt didn’t have 
enough machinery at the time.272 An admiration of Western civilization’s achievements, as well as 
Eurocentrism-influenced views of the Islamic civilization lagging behind in time, can be detected in 
these accounts. Port Said’s natives are described as “copper-colored”, the men with “long and 
curly” beards and the women covering themselves “so only their eyes are visible”, and the Japanese 
claim that because it is so hot and dry, the common people normally sleep on the ground.273
   When visiting Yemen, they present a theory of why the people of “tropical regions” are not 
performing great achievements the way Europeans are. The Japanese claim that they in the parts of 
Europe with the harshest climate and the least fertile ground observed that the local people seemed 
to always be working all-day until exhausted, “throughout the year”,274 and then contrast this to 
fertile “tropical regions”, where people “don’t need to” develop solutions such as clothes for cold 
weather, protection of their homes against wind and rain. They don’t even need to concern 
themselves with storing food for the future, it was claimed - because everything they eat “grows 
easily”. After eating, “they lie down”, and “pass their days almost like beggars”, content just by 
continuing to live, “and so in thousands of years they have not advanced one step in civilization”,275 
the Japanese harshly claim. In countries like Britain and France, people are forced to work hard for 
anything, and thanks to this create great civilizations, was the embassy’s conclusion.
 The theory can be seen as influenced by environmental determinism, which was introduced to 
Japan by Thomas Buckle, whose History of Civilisation in England was widely read in the Meiji 
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period. Also, Friedrich Ratzel, inventor of the term “Lebensraum” was influential in Europe at the 
time of the embassy’s visit. The period when Europe was at the height of infatuation with 
Darwinian ideas coincided with Japan’s modernization, when it studied the West more eagerly than 
ever before.276 From the 1890s, environmental determinism was even taught in school.277
 Conclusively, one can see that 1870s Japan, with new ideas and uncritical admiration for 
Europe, took a Eurocentric and arguably rather ignorant view on Islamic countries and their people. 
One can detect a belief in Western society being the world’s most ‘modern’ and ‘civilized’, and a 
self-image of Japan being ranked second. Non-Western, non-Japanese cultures were thus in this 
period’s modernity discourse looked down upon: They were regarded hierarchically below, and the 
Japanese seemed eager to differentiate themselves from other non-Western societies, and legitimize 
their rank as second. Contemporary phenomena such as assimilation pressure towards Muslims (see 
section 3.4) and the view of their culture as ‘backwards’ or ‘uncivilized’ (see section 5.4) can be 
interpreted as the legacy of this Meiji era strain of thought.
 Furthermore, some may argue that today’s Japanese hold similarly ignorant views on, and 
images of, Islamic countries, though their views and images this time correspond with the US’s 
rather than Europe’s, as many Japanese may see the Islamic world through an ‘American lens’. 
Either way, between the ignorance of the early Meiji era and that of the post-Cold War, post-
September-11 era, there was a considerable period of time when Japan’s view on the Islamic world 
took completely different turns. In the first half of the 20th century, philosophical and political ties 
to the Islamic world, and awareness of Muslims in public discourse as well as in high-level politics, 
arguably was at a historic all-time high.
4.2 Early 20th century
Mutual interest between the Islamic world and Japan: Pan-Islamism and Pan-Asianism
Intellectuals all across Asia admired Japan for using Western civilization against Western 
imperialism and for becoming Asia’s first constitutional monarchy. The Meiji Restoration was 
perceived as a model for how to modernize without becoming too Westernized or turning to 
Christianity. At the turn of the century, Japan-Islamic relations comprised of transnational 
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affiliations linking Japanese Pan-Asianist intellectuals, military officials and diplomats with their 
Pan-Islamic counterparts.278
 Japan’s Pan-Asianism is today often closely associated with expansionism - in contemporary 
Japanese dictionaries the term is often defined as the Asian nations united “under Japanese 
leadership” to resist Western invasion.279 Yet, Pan-Asianism researcher Eri Hotta divides Pan-
Asianism into three stages,280 where only the final stage matches this image. While the first  stage 
emphasized the spiritual and philosophical dimensions of Asia,281 the second sought an alliance 
between the nations of Asia. As an example of the second, she cites the government-sponsored Tōa 
Dōbunkai (“East Asian Same Letters Society”), founded in 1898,282 who called for a Sino-Japanese 
alliance of equals, arguing they, being of the same race, should stand together against the white 
race.283 The third form is associated with Japan’s expansionist ideology of leadership in Asia.284 As 
an example, she cites the ultranationalist and violent Kokuryūkai (“Amur River Society”), founded 
in 1901, who argued that the Japanese Empire should transform their weak Asian neighbor 
countries in the image of Japan.285
Islamic World’s admiration for, and presence in, Japan
When Japan defeated Russia in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, the news “electrified” the 
nationalist movement in India, to whom “Japan’s victory shattered the illusion of European 
invincibility”.286 Likewise, Islamic newspapers celebrated the news as a victory for the Eastern 
people over the West, as well as for constitutionalism over despotism.287 Egyptian, Turkish and 
Persian poets wrote odes to the Japanese nation and emperor, and many Muslims sought 
cooperation with Japan, which was increasingly being regarded a promising challenger to Western 
hegemony.288 
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 Anti-colonial activists from various countries gathered in Japan, which became a center of 
activity for all Asians who had a white enemy to defeat and wished as study modernization without 
westernization. They included the likes of Vietnamese nationalism pioneer Phan Boi Chau289, who 
observed Japan to learn how to defeat the French, and Indian nationalist activist Rash Behari Bose, 
who fled from the British, went into exile in Japan, and eventually joined the Kokuryūkai.290 The 
Ottoman Pan-Islamist intellectual Abdürresid Ibrahim described the Tokyo of 1908 as “a haven for 
Muslim activists seeking collaboration with Japan against Western powers”.291 Ibrahim made a 
translation for the Islamic World of the pamphlet “Asia in Danger” by Hasan Hatano Uho, a 
Japanese Pan-Asianist who had adopted a Muslim name, and advocated an alliance of the Japanese 
and Ottomans to prevent European imperialism in Asia. The pamphlet had photos of beheadings, 
tortures, and massacres conducted in Asia by Western imperialists.292 To the various nationalists 
movements that saw their members being taken under Japanese protection, the support meant a lot: 
To Indian nationalists for example, although Japan gave no “material” support to the Indian cause, 
the fact that revolutionaries found refuge in Japan was a source of encouragement.293
Expansionism and Taishō Period
Japan gradually grew more expansionist and imperialistic, while continuing their fascination with 
ideas such as social darwinism and environmental determinism. Having found inspiration in 
Europe’s discourse of ‘civilization’, and the “white man’s burden” of occupying and ruling 
territories in Asia and Africa, Japan as a ‘civilized country’ saw themselves contributing to the 
progress of world civilization by bearing their part of the burden, and set out to attain a number of 
colonies, starting with Taiwan in 1895 and Korea in 1910.294 The following Taishō (1912 - 1926) 
period was marked by even greater expansionism and outward-looking perspective, and eventually, 
Japanese authorities made use of contacts between Japanese Pan-Asianists and Muslims to 
systematically practice an Islam policy.295
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 In the years following the 1917 Russian Revolution, a few hundred Turkism Muslims 
emigrated from Russia to Japan.296 The Pan-Asianist and Pan-Islamic movements both became 
increasingly military-oriented and anticommunist right-wing in character following the revolution, 
and the Japanese government started actively using Islam against communism.297 The Japanese 
argued the Soviet Union would eventually face a “nationality problem” with their Altaic 
Muslims,298 and arguments of a special link between the Japanese and North Asian peoples 
speaking Altaic languages was increasingly heard in public discourse. The strong pro-Islam currents 
in the government were due to belief that Islam could contain communism, and the hope that the 
world’s 300 million Muslims could be potential allies.299
4.3 1930s
The Japanese puppet state of Manshū-koku, which existed in Manchuria from 1932 to 1945 and was 
actively promoted as multi-ethnic,300 became a haven for many Pan-Islamist exiles. Escaping 
Leninist and Stalinist oppression, they settled down in the puppet state under protection of the 
Japanese military, which saw this large community of Muslim immigrants as a force that could be 
used for anti-Russian intelligence.301 One prominent figure among these Muslim exiles was Kurban 
Ali, who pioneered the Tokyo Mosque project,302 which was completed in 1938 and whose official 
support from the Japanese government can be interpreted as a confirmation on their behalf on the 
adoption of an Islam policy as part of their Asianist foreign policy.303 The opening ceremony of the 
mosque was attended by the Japanese government and elite as well as international guests from 
various Islamic countries whose trip had been covered by Japan.304
 By the end of the 1930s, there were roughly 1000 Muslims in Japan.305 In 1939, the Japanese 
government discussed adding Islam to the official list of religions in Japan’s new Religion Law, 
along with Buddhism, Shinto and Christianity, but eventually did not mention it directly in the law, 
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fearing it would generate Soviet suspicion of Japan’s outreach among Central Asian Muslims. In the 
early 1940s, the number of books and journals on Islam published, and the the purchase of library 
collections of European-language books on Islam all increased drastically, mostly thanks to state 
funding - by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the military and Manchuria-related establishments, 
who argued that a better understanding of the Muslim colonial subjects was needed.
4.4 1940s
Respected scholar Shumei Okawa, philosophy graduate of Tokyo Imperial University, focused 
entirely on Islamic studies in his later years. To Okawa, the Pan-Islamism’s challenge to the West’s 
domination was a historical turning point.306 He emphasized that Japanese anti-Islamic sentiments 
were due to the fact that Japan’s major source of information on Islam, Christian Europeans, had 
been in conflicts with Islamic powers since the Middle Ages, and argued that anti-Muslim views 
had spread to all Westernized parts of Asia. He also challenged the view of Islam’s spread being due 
to Muslim militaristic expansion, emphasizing that Islam is a peaceful religion usually spread 
through missionary work.307 In 1942, Okawa released a lecture collection called “Introduction to 
Islam” to help the war effort.308 During the war trials in Tokyo, Okawa justified Japan’s mission to 
liberate Asia from Western colonialism by war if necessary,309 but his behavior during the trials led 
to him being sent to a mental ward following imprisonment. In prison and the mental ward, he 
translated the Koran to Japanese.310
 Until the end of the war, the Japanese Empire had a vast number of Muslim subjects 
throughout Asia.311 One example of the actual gains of Japan’s Islam policy is the 1942 invasion of 
the Dutch Indies, when the military’s entrance was assisted by Japanese Muslims who mobilized 
Indonesian Muslim leaders and communities to aid the invasion.312 Indonesia, today home to the 
world’s largest Muslim population, was occupied by Japan until the war defeat in 1945. 
Nevertheless, besides the case of Indonesia, Japan does not have an imperialist past in the Islamic 
World, and was rather to some degree imagined as fighting on the same side in the ‘battle’ of 
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‘civilisations’. And although, as discussed in Chapter 2, the new ‘homogeneous’, ‘single-race’ 
Japan developed afterwards largely forgot its ties to the Islamic World, in some cases this past is 
still to traceable to a certain degree: Taro Aso, in his time as foreign minister, made controversial 
remarks about how the physical characteristics of “blue eyes and blond hair” makes it hard to gain 
trust in the Middle East, due to a history of Western exploitation in the region, but that the Japanese 
with their “yellow faces” and no history of exploiting the region or are now “doing what Americans 
can't do”.313
5. Contemporary Japanese Images of 
Muslims
Does the contemporary Japanese public have defined personal impressions of Muslim immigrants? 
Citizens of the Kantō region are likely to have enough contact to form such impressions, with the 
heavy concentration of Muslims in the region, although there are unfortunately few surveys 
examining such views. The lack of research examining views on Muslims held Kantō’s population, 
or Japan’s national population, is an unfilled gap that would be interesting to explore in future 
research. Although by no means a representative selection, Sakurai conducted a survey on students 
of her (women’s) university in Tokyo. No less than 27 % of respondents, who were general students 
(not students taking courses on related subjects), stated they sometimes see Muslim foreigners in 
their local area. About half of these respondents had also had conversations with these residents.314 
In general, however, Japanese have very limited direct experience with Muslims, and their views on 
them are therefore largely shaped by representations of them by the media315 and authorities.
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5.1 Image of Muslims I - ‘Outsiders’ in the ‘homogeneous’ 
nation of Japan 
Muslim immigrants in Japan may feel that they, despite their hard work and contributions to society, 
are not wanted due to simply not ‘belonging’. According to Sakurai,316 many Muslim immigrants 
currently feel isolated and not like true members of Japanese society, and Onishi argues Muslim 
immigrants are met with a Japanese meta-narrative of homogeneity, which labels them as 
outsiders.317 Foreigners in Japan are frequently labeled this way: gaikokujin, the Japanese word for 
foreign person, is often shortened to just gaijin, which literally means “outside person”. The fact 
that Japanese often regard new and different citizens as mere ‘outsiders’, a word bearing negative 
connotations, makes it difficult to convince them of the positive aspects of diversity in society. 
Siddle argues that any celebration of ethnic diversity in Japan is always met by “the master 
narrative of seamless national homogeneity that dominates Japan’s discursive space”.318 What is 
this master narrative of homogeneity?
 As discussed earlier, the aggressive expansionist Japanese Empire of the former half of the 
20th century was completely overhauled following the crushing defeat in World War Two. The re-
invented and re-branded Japan granted all colonies independence,319 and emphasised its cultural and 
racial homogeneity. Some may argue that the hegemonic narratives of Japan as a homogeneous 
nation after 1945 were actually just a slightly altered continuation of the wartime dominant official 
ideology of the family-state.320 Either way, Japan was to be presented as homogeneous nation with 
only ‘ethnic Japanese’. What exactly a ‘Japanese’ is, however, has shifted various times through 
history. While an ethnic Japanese by some definitions is supposed to be a native of the Japanese 
islands, there are several minority groups that are native to the relatively arbitrary collection of 
islands that today are defined as the political entity ‘Japan’. The ryukyu and the ainu, perceived as 
foreign before they were re-branded as ‘Japanese’, are both distinct ethnic groups with their own 
culture, history and language. 
 Still, the demography discourse of the politicians of post-war Japan has underplayed the 
significance of these ethnic minorities, considering all Japanese to be of one ‘race’, and the 
imagined merits of Japan’s homogeneity have been stressed over and over again by prolific ruling 
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politicians in post-war Japan. The ruling party in this context is the LDP, who ruled Japan almost 
continuously from the end of World War Two until 2009. The LDP can also to some degree be seen 
as a continuation of the ruling power in wartime Japan: After the war, and the dissolution of the 
nationalistic and militaristic government, the same conservative elite was quite quickly once more 
assigned to rule Japan, the only exception being the military elite.321 Conservative politicians put in 
prison at the end of the war were soon released in the interest of the US, whose strategic plan for 
Japan in the Cold War era prioritized the effective development of a high growth, successfully 
capitalist, anti-communist state separated from rest of the region.
 The LDP of today is a big coalition of many fractions, and these fractions have quite 
different positions on the political spectrum. However, a number of highly prominent LDP 
politicians - including Prime Ministers - up until today have had political profiles which can be 
described as a right-of-center populist with clear nationalist tendencies (or been outright 
proclaiming themselves as ‘nationalist’). These outspoken LDP politicians have shown no hesitance 
in time and again making a point of Japan’s supposed homogeneity. LDP prime minister Yasuhiro 
Nakasone in 1986 went as far as stating that “Japan has no ‘racial minorities’”322 (ignoring not only 
different ethnic groups such as ainu and ryukyu, but also the large presence of Koreans, who are 
also usually described as a different ‘race’) and that Japan’s economy was superior to the US’s 
because the former has a homogeneous population of only Japanese, while the population of the US 
includes groups such as blacks, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans.323
 The homogeneity discourse emphasised by politicians like Nakasone can be seen as not only 
nationalist, but also racist. Balibar,324 exploring the relationship between nationalism and racism, 
argues that nationalism “nurtures the fetishes of a national identity” which has derived from the 
nation’s origins and needs to be preserved,325 and also that racism constantly induces racial and 
cultural pureness for the nation in order for the nation to be itself.326 The nation thus has to isolate, 
before eliminating or expelling, ‘false’ or ‘exogenous’ elements, he argues.327 A moderate version of 
this strain of thoughts can appear to be wide-spread in Japan as well. The idea of Japan being at risk 
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for losing its uniqueness and ‘Japaneseness’ due to the contemporary increase of foreigners and 
‘international’ elements in society, is a popular and wide-spread thought that can be easily exploited 
by populist politicians.
Cultural nationalism in Japan
The imagining of homogeinity is a discourse that is part of a larger body of thought: cultural 
nationalism. Central to cultural nationalism is the construction of a national us through emphasising 
one’s own country’s unique culture, as opposed to foreign cultures, exaggerating or even inventing 
differences between us and the others. Cultural nationalism, Inoguchi argues, arises when national 
unity and boundaries are “confronted by globalisation’s penetration and/or subversion” and 
“involves the yearning for an imagined community”.328 It responds by making use of national 
memory and identity and is defensive in aim but aggressive in manifestation - functioning as a “last 
bastion of anti-globalisation protest”.329
 In the 1980s the Japanese education system was altered and nationalism saw an upswing, after a 
period of right-wing politicians, led by Nakasone, urged a renewal of Japanese national pride and 
patriotism.330 Nakasone advocated an internationalization of society, but argued this could not be 
done without strengthening national identity. Nakasone’s campaign, as well as the changes to the 
educational system, which included the introduction of controversial history textbooks and of 
mandatory use of nationalist symbols Hinomaru (the national flag) and Kimigayo (the national 
anthem) at schools, have been criticized for only showcasing desire to strengthen Japan’s position in 
the world and the Japanese’s patriotic sentiments, not desire to foster international understanding.
 Japan’s recession since 1991 has coincided with China’s economic rise, and the Japanese public 
has seen large-scale restructuring and redundancies as companies move production to China331. 
Additionally, many Japanese citizens grew critical of the political relationship of the US and Japan 
in the years following September 11th 2001, as their government’s support for the US’s ‘War on 
Terror’ included dispatching Japan’s Self Defence Forces to the Indian Ocean and Kuwait to assist 
US troops.332 To many citizens, this was a violation of the constitution, which proclaims Japan as a 
pacifist nation never to be engaged in war.
74 / 121
328 Takashi Inoguchi, “Globalisation and cultural nationalism”. In The Cambridge Companion to Modern Japanese Culture, edited by Yoshio 
Sugimoto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 337-339.
329 Ibid.
330 Bruaset, “Nasjonalisme i etterkrigstidens Japan”, 222-224.
331 Inoguchi, “Globalisation and cultural nationalism”, 346.
332 With refueling aircrafts while in the Indian Ocean, and with shipping materials, vehicles, food and medicine while in Kuwait. See Inoguchi, 
“Globalisation and cultural nationalism”, 347.
 The negative sentiments towards specific countries such as China and the US, combined with a 
yearning for a truly Japanese identity in the face of globalisation’s weakening of the national unity, 
can both be seen as causes for cultural nationalism in Japan. McCormack argues that Japan’s great 
post-war economic success caused a kokusaika or “internationalization” of Japan, but that this 
kokusaika in effect only signified Japan’s “increased weight” in the tripolar world economy centred 
on Japan, North America and the EU - not an internationalization of domestic Japanese society. The 
same success that creates this kokusaika, he argues, continues to stimulate a desire to assert Japan’s 
identity more forcefully, which sharpens international and domestic tensions.333
 Morris-Suzuki makes similar arguments to McCormack about the causal relationship of 
kokusaika and ideological currents such as ‘homogeneity’ discourse and cultural nationalism, 
arguing that developments in transport and communications as well as the rapid flow of capital and 
people in the world today are threatening to undermine conventional images of ‘national culture’, 
and that the uncertainty caused by this generates desire to define cultural tradition.334 The question 
of culture became especially noticeable in Japan because its ‘internationalization’ coincided with a 
dramatical growth of its power in the world, she argues.335 Murphy-Shigematsu, on the other hand, 
views the emphasis on homogeinity as less new, with different historical reasons. What he calls an 
"obsession with maintaining an illusion of oneness", and of being a "homogenous nation that has 
evolved naturally since ancient times" might be connected to attempts of negating the failure of 
Japanizing colonial subjects like the Koreans during the colonial period, he argues.336
 One concrete way the strong desire to assert Japanese identity has manifested itself, has been 
the post-war phenomenon of nihonjin-ron - a popular literary genre whose name can be translated 
into “theory or discourse on what it means to be Japanese”, and which focuses on issues of national 
and cultural identity. Nihonjin-ron literature can be found incorporating any number of fields such 
as psychology, history, sociology and philosophy. A key feature of nihonjin-ron is its emphasis on 
Japanese culture as the key to the country’s economic success, as well as the uniqueness of Japan.337 
Nihonjin-ron literature on the Japanese language has suggested it is so unique, only the Japanese are 
able to ever fully learn it. During the bubble economy, when the popularity of nihonjin-ron 
literature was at its peak, its focus on the uniqueness of Japan was matched by extraordinary 
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Japanese economic success. As foreigners attempted to find explanations to Japan’s success, many 
turned to the same narrative of uniqueness: Ezra Vogel’s Japan As Number One (1979) is an 
example of one such work, over-emphasizing Japan’s uniqueness. The book eventually sold better 
in Japan than in any other country.338
 Ryang argues that for many decades after the war, 
ethnographic studies of Japan focused on “strange, unfamiliar 
aspects of Japanese society, fundamentally different from those 
of the west”, matched by “Japan’s self-promotion as culturally 
unique, with its post-war prosperity being attributed to its racial 
homogeinity”. 339 When it comes to popular representations of 
Japan, this is arguably still the case: During media coverage of 
the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami disaster and its 
aftermath, one could see a resurgence of foreign commentators 
describing Japanese society with a narrative of uniqueness. 
German weekly magazine Stern, the second biggest German-
language news magazine of its kind,340 on their cover page proclaimed the Japanese as Das 
unglaubliche Volk (“the incredible people”), openly suggesting their culture and experiences with 
catastrophies shape their mentality into one marked by proudness, discipline, unselfishness and the 
ability to cope well with suffering.341 Arguably, nihonjin-ron is not merely a manifestation of 
Japanese self-celebration, but a body of thought fueled by foreign discourse as well.
 
The notion of ‘race’ and the Japanese concept of blood line
A potential reason for why foreigners like Muslim immigrants are perceived as ‘outsiders’ in Japan 
is the fact that they’re imagined to be of a different ‘race’, and the Japanese national identity has 
been emphasised as ‘single-race’. The classification of homo sapiens into different subspecies, or 
‘races’, based on their physical appearance has been outdated as a biological concept due to 
developments in genetics342. The concept is however still relevant as a social concept - regardless of 
their imagined nature, ‘races’ still undeniably have real and significant influence on human 
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relations. The social construction of ‘race’ can be viewed in light of power relations, originating in 
certain historical contexts, where one group aims to differentiate, exclude and dominate another.343
 Concepts such as the family-state, and the close association of ‘race’ and ‘nationality’, in 
East asian countries like Japan (Korea being a similar case) can be seen as obstacles to the inclusion 
of foreigners into society. The Japanese people can in the Japanese language be described as being a 
minzoku - a word that can be translated as “people”, “race”, “ethnic group” or “nation”, illustrating 
a history of interchangeability of ‘race’ and nationality. When the Meiji elite of the late 1880s was 
concerned about the population’s lacking sense of national unity, they applied the concepts of 
minzoku and common ancestry in order to build the ‘imagined community’ of the nation344. They 
emphasized Japan’s unbroken imperial line, and advocated that the basis of the state’s foundation 
was that the state “is a great family” and the family “a small state”.345 Stressing ‘race’, and abusing 
deep-rooted concepts of ancestry ideology, the Meiji elite managed to build a Japanese nation state 
on the premise of it being a single-race natural entity of one big family. In the 1930s, this concept 
was taken even further, and the overlap between ‘race’ and nation became even stronger346 in the 
official promotion of the view that every Japanese shared common ancestry in Amaterasu Omikami, 
the Sun Goddess.
  The concepts of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nationality’ are closely linked in Japan, and will continue to 
be a difficult paradigm to challenge. A division of the two concepts is a quite new idea in Europe as 
well: Western Europe already had substantial levels of immigration of workers in the 1950s and 
60s, but the gradual change into multicultural societies and the eventual development of a 
perception of nationality and ethnicity as separate has been a slow process. In fact, the concept is 
still controversial, and far from commonly accepted. In Japan, which had virtually no official 
immigration until the 1980s347, and is still accepting few immigrants yearly, the concept of ethnicity  
and nationality as separate entities still has weak foothold, and these new concepts of identity have 
to challenge traditional concepts such as the Japanese “blood line”.
  Dikötter cites a survey that explored Japanese’s feelings towards less “obvious” foreign 
immigrants - namely, Japanese-Americans and Koreans”.348 The survey found that most 
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respondents “did not foresee any serious obstacles” for Japanese-Americans in adjusting to Japan 
and integrating culturally, despite being born and socialized in the US, citing reasons such as them 
having ‘Japanese blood’, and thus being able to “eventually learn to behave and think like ‘us’” 
after a period of adjustment - something they had less confidence in the Koreans succeeding in 
because “it was claimed they do not have ‘Japanese blood’”. Dikötter argues that this comparison 
reveals the racialised nature of Japanese cultural identity.349 Next, he cites another survey, which he 
conducted himself on “fairly well-educated” sections of the population.350 He found that the 
majority of respondents to his survey believed that foreigners, even those born in Japan, could not 
fully become part of social life in Japan, being unable to understand, and adjust to, the distinctive 
Japanese patterns of behavior and thought.
 A typical narrative of uniqueness, the imagined similarities between all members of the 
‘Japanese race’ suggested here also indicates a belief in that the Japanese ‘imagined community’ 
goes along race and blood lines. Weiner suggests that race in Japan is imagined in the sense that it 
has no real biological foundation and that the members of the “race” don’t know most of their 
fellow members, yet feel a sense of communion.351 Operating with a ‘blood line’ concept for 
defining belongingness is however hardly unique to Japan. As discussed in section 2.2, Japan is 
similar to not only South Korea, but also Israel and Germany in this regard. 
 In conclusion, one can interpret the Japanese perception of Muslim foreigners being 
'outsiders' even after settling down in Japan as a consequence of a combination of post-war 
'homogeneity' discourse, cultural nationalism, nihonjin-ron discourse, and the close and rasialised 
link between 'ethnicity' and 'nation', as well as the idea of the state as a family, in modern Japan. 
Politicians and media frquently reinforce these discourses and ideologies.
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5.2 Image of Muslims II - ‘Illegals’
Japanese government and police, pursuing strict anti-
overstayer policies, at times employ speculative methods to 
track down these ‘illegals’. In urban areas in major cities, 
leaflets or posters spreading propaganda-like messages about 
the dangers of foreigners have not only stressed them as 
‘illegals‘ in the sense of overstaying their visas, but singled 
them out as criminals in a broader sense. A poster distributed 
by the police in Ikunoku, Osaka in 2007 (see illustration to 
the right), read: “Help us stop illegal overstaying and illegal 
labor - in these days of foreign crime rapidly increasing”352 - 
despite recent national news of crimes committed by 
foreigners declining.353 Suggestions of everyone 
“cooperating” to track down the criminals, combined with illustrations of white- and brown-skinned 
foreigners, encouraged unhealthy and racist patterns of thought to the mainstream society, of being 
watchful of all tangibly different minorities and assume them to be criminals.
 Also in popular culture, Muslim immigrants may be 
portrayed as ‘illegal’ marginalized members of society. The 
popular television drama series Ikebukuro West Gate Park 
(2000) featured a character named Ali, an illegal immigrant. 
In episode four of the series, the protagonist Makoto pays a 
visit to Ali’s home, and it appears he is living tightly jammed 
together with four other similar-looking immigrants in a tiny 
apartment in secrecy (see illustration to the left, or the video 
clip [http://bit.ly/h2XQw5]). Ali is in the episode portrayed 
as kind but troubled, and ends up being deported.354 While 
the character is represented in a relatively flattering fashion, 
it still contributes to an image of people of middle eastern 
appearances being ‘illegals’. Komai suggests avoiding the 
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term ‘illegal workers’, as it bears connotations of crime, and encourages using the term 
‘undocumented workers’ instead. He argues that the activity of these workers differs from what we 
usually think of as crime, considering they do not injure other people or steal property, but instead 
diligently perform work that Japanese people do not wish to do.355 Campaigns such as the Ikunoku 
police’s posters spreads fear and mistrust based on physical looks, singling out human beings who 
in reality do not constitute any danger to the public, and whose only ‘crime’ constitutes of filling 
work positions the Japanese economy would be struggling to fill without them.
5.3 Image of Muslims III - ‘Terrorist’ image?
The terrorist attacks in New York City on September 11 2001 killed 24 Japanese citizens, and 
generated associations of Islam with terrorism. Suspicions of al Qaeda and other radical groups 
establishing in Japan, and Osama Bin Laden’s verbal threats against Japan in his 2003 message on 
al Jazeera356 didn’t improve the situation either. At the same time as Muslim immigrants are getting 
increasingly settled down in Japan, skepticism toward Islam persists due to misconceptions of Islam 
being a ‘terrorist’ religion,357 and Muslims in Japan feel vulnerable due to being viewed with 
suspicion after September 11.358 A 2006 survey of high school students in Japan revealed that 75 % 
of the students believed Islam was aggressive - 92 % of the same students cited television as their 
main source of information about Islam.359 The current DPJ-led government in December 2010 
launched a new defense policy for 2011 to 2015 emphasizing terrorism and guerilla attacks 
specifically, describing them as “new threats”.360
 The fear of domestic Muslim ‘terrorists’ made major headlines in 2004, when the small 
community of Nishi-Kawaguchi outside Tokyo was subject to a police raid where at least eight 
foreigners, who were suspected Al-Qaeda members, were arrested.361 Japan’s National Police 
Agency in 2005 spread further fear through a pamphlet that said Japan “is not immune from 
international terrorism”, pointing out that there are Islamic communities in Japan, and that these 
communities of foreign residents may be exploited by extremists in the future. Since, the police has 
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also contacted Muslim leaders in Japan, asking them about any Islamic terrorist plots in Japan.362 In 
November 2010, a leak of documents from a counterterrorism unit of the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Police Department's Public Security Bureau (antiterrorism intelligence institution formed by the 
Koizumi government after September 11) stirred controversy in the media.363 The documents, 
which were leaked through internet file-sharing software, listed details of “terrorist suspects” 
including their photographs and extensive personal information including birthplaces, home and 
work addresses, names and birthdays of spouses, children and associates, personal histories, 
immigration records and the names of local mosques visited by the ‘suspects’.364 The documents 
were mostly PDF files, and contained information on more than 600 persons.365
 Listed ‘suspects’ were Muslims living and working in Japan, many of them having resided in 
the country for decades and being married to Japanese nationals. As an example of one such 
individual, the Japan Times cited the Algerian Mourad Bendjaballah, who after 20 years in Japan 
found his name on the list for no reason beyond formerly having worked as a travel agent, a 
profession involving “contact with Arab students, businessmen and diplomats”.366 While the Japan 
Times in their coverage of the case stressed how this leak could potentially ruin the new lives these 
innocent ‘suspects’ had created for themselves in Japan, Asahi Shimbun rather emphasized how the 
case is a “potential disaster that could shatter international trust in Japanese police”.367 Indeed, the 
case did constitute an international problem as the documents revealed “plans for questioning of 
Muslims in Japan based on requests from the FBI”.368 Japan Times went as far as calling it an 
“apparently deliberate data leak” by the police, while Asahi Shimbun stressed that “a roster of 
police officers [...] as well as the names and address of investigators” were leaked as well.
 “The police have broken in a few seconds what it took me 20 years to build," (...) "My wife and I are 
 good people; we work and pay our taxes and raise our child. Who knows where this file will 
 go?” (Bendjaballah, as cited by the Japan Times)
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At the end of the same month, the Tokyo publisher Dai-San Shokan already released a 469-page 
book of leaked documents, containing personal data about police officers and Muslim residents. 
The publisher argued that since this data already was accessible to anyone through the Internet, 
there were no moral issues with printing the volume.369 This view was not shared by a group of 13 
Muslims, who made the news towards the end of the year by filing a suit against the publisher, 
demanding a halt of the publication of the book as well as 42.9 million yen in damages, for 
infringing on their privacy. The groups’ attorney emphasized how misinformation in the leaked 
police reports contributed to undeservingly ruining these Muslims‘ reputation.370
 Although a recent reinforcement of the ‘terrorist image’ of Muslims has been seen in these 
news stories, one cannot really say that Muslims have any widespread demonized ‘terrorist’ image 
in Japan in the same way as they have in Europe. In Japan, it is much more common to single out 
Pyongyang-affiliated zainichi as terrorists. The foreign minority group with the strongest ‘terrorist’ 
image definitely is North Koreans: To the general Japanese, the very real and close threat of 
neighbor country North Korea, as well as fear-spreading cases such as the abduction of Japanese 
nationals by North Koreans, makes the ‘North Korean threat’ much more relevant to Japanese 
citizens than Islamist extremist terrorism happening on European and North American soil. Indeed, 
the recent disclosures of terrorism investigations on Muslim citizens of Japan showed that the 
reason for the investigations were requests directed to Japan from the US, not domestic concerns 
about Islamic terrorism. Sakurai argues that while some Muslims in Japan are frustrated about the 
suspicion directed towards them since September 11, there is currently no indication of Japan’s 
muslim population radicalizing, or constituting any threat to society.371
5.4 Image of Muslims IV - ‘Backwards’ / ‘uncivilized’
Miura quotes a Japanese high school textbook which says “the belief and doctrine of Islam has been 
established in severe natural conditions (of the desert) and characteristics of strictness and strength, 
quite different from the Japanese preference for mildness, warmth, and ambiguity.”372 This, 
bafflingly enough, matches the Iwakura Mission’s environmental determinist inspired judgements 
on the peoples of Islamic countries. Does indeed Japanese images of Islam regard the ‘Islamic 
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civilization’ and its people to be shaped by the climate of deserts? While this question may be hard 
to answer, one can note a general tendency of believing the cultures of Islamic countries to be 
harsher, less complex, or even less ‘civilized’ than those of Japan - in other words, ‘backwards’.
 As touched upon earlier, it can be argued that Japanese modernity discourse hierarchically 
places the cultures of countries from regions such as the Middle East and South Asia below the 
culture of Japan, which again in the global competition only ranks below Western culture in terms 
of being ‘modern’ and ‘civilized’. Japan prides itself on being more ‘civilized’ than other non-
Western countries, yet at the same time still struggles with the inferiority complex of not being 
Western. Islamic countries may also be associated with economic inferiority: One respondent in 
Onishi’s qualitative study on foreign Muslim workers, a Bangladeshi who had stayed in Japan for 
nine years, expressed he was tired of “being seen with the image of a poor country”.373 Another 
respondent, a Pakistani who had lived in Japan for almost ten years, claimed that such negative 
images were connected to his physical appearances, and that Europeans and Americans were judged 
differently. A survey among high school students in Japan revealed that 53 % of them associated 
Islam with backwards regions of the world.374
 Such survey results, and Sakurai’s comments about Japanese perceptions of Islam as a 
backwards third-world religion versus Christianity as a symbol of modernity, indicates a widespread 
impression of Islamic countries as associated with ‘backwardness’. No mere post-war phenomena, 
this once again matches the views of the Iwakura Mission’s impressions of the Western and Islamic 
worlds. To some Japanese, the West may be viewed as the pinnacle of modernity, while the Islamic 
World represents something Japan decided to distance itself from during its modernization. That 
which is not Western nor Japanese, is easily labeled as more or less “barbaric”. However, when 
Japanese may perceive individual Muslim workers from countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and 
Iran as more “barbaric” than themselves, a more important factor than their religious affiliation 
might in fact be their physical looks.
5.5 Image of Muslims V - Bearded man rather than man of 
faith
In the debate of immigrant minorities in Western Europe, great emphasis is usually placed on their 
religious affiliation, but Japanese are generally less interested in the religious grouping ‘Muslim’, 
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and more interested in grouping people according to physical characteristics. This can be contrasted 
to South Korea, whose citizens generally have a stronger religious consciousness: While Japan 
never became Christianized, Christianity has played a major role in South Korea’s modern history. 
In the highly secularized and religion-indifferent Japan, the important parameter for classifying 
foreigners is physical appearance, while in Korea, both physical appearance and religious affiliation 
appear to be important parameters.
Disinterest in religion
The reason why Japanese are less interested in religious affiliation are manifold. Japan is today a 
highly secularized society, with a sharp separation of church and state. Looking at the role of 
religion in modern-age Japan, it has not always been this way. Tokugawa era leaders required each 
citizen to make an annual official denial of Christianity,375 to ensure they did not become agents of 
Western imperialism. In this period, Buddhism was of deep official importance in society: by law, 
every household had to be affiliated with a Buddhist temple and every citizen had to be given a 
Buddhist funeral. This relationship between temples and households led to the compulsory danka 
system, a system where households financially support a designated Buddhist temple in return for 
spiritual services.376 The system was voluntary before the Tokugawa Period – its origins can be 
traced  back to the Heian period (794 - 1185)377 – and the system is again voluntary today, but the 
Tokugawa shogunate turned it into a system of citizen registration, and a way to control the public. 
For the Buddhist establishment, the system was a practical way to ensure its survival in this early 
modern period of Japan’s.378
 In the Meiji period, the new constitution stated that every citizen was to have religious 
freedom, as long as the religious practice does not conflict with citizens’ public duties.379 At the 
same time, however, the nationalistic Meiji elite worked to institutionalize the Japan-native shinto 
religion as the new de facto ‘national religion’ in favor of the ‘exogenous’ religion of buddhism that 
had dominated in the Tokugawa Period. Shinto eventually was strongly exploited by the oligarchs 
of the Empire of Japan until its dissolution, when the new (and still active) 1946 Japanese 
Constitution formally completely separated religion and state. The current constitution bans the 
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State from teaching religion in the education system, and from privileging certain religions or 
allowing them to exercise any political authority. Individuals are guaranteed religious freedom, 
never to be compelled to take part in any religious rituals.380
 Penn argues that while Buddhism and Shinto have very deep roots in Japan, Japanese society 
simultaneously is remarkably secular. Religion’s role in daily lives is very different in Japan 
compared to the role of Islam in daily life that Makino describes in the article posted on Isurāmu 
Bunka no Hōmupēji. Except for those few following new religions, most Japanese don’t perform 
daily religious practices or “concern themselves with broad philosophical questions regarding the 
meaning of life or the nature of existence”.381  Religion is rather a part of tradition, and does for 
most Japanese not at all need to provide an all-encompassing fixed package of solutions to all of 
life’s sides and questions: The average Japanese incorporate elements of rituals of both Shinto and 
Buddhism, and sometimes also Christianity, making few distinctions among them. One may have a 
coming-of-age day at a shinto temple, a wedding at a Christian church (the way they do in Western 
movies), and finally leave this world in a Buddhist burial. When going to a shrine or temple, most 
Japanese will not care much about which is which, and which god they are praying to. The rituals, 
practices and events at religious sites are well attended, but most Japanese are quite uninterested in 
discussing religious beliefs. Showing strong interest in religion is frowned upon, and so are 
religious symbols - except for in festivals.
 In Japanese society, interference of religion in social gatherings is generally accepted if the 
social gathering consists of people interconnected by personal in-group ties - for example, if a 
gathering of friends and family uses a buddhist priest at a funeral, or a company uses a shinto priest 
to purify a construction site - but if the social gathering is organized by any form of polity - may it 
be a national, prefectural or municipal event, or even a public school, the intermeddling of a priest 
or of religious rituals would be likely to cause public outrage. 
Emphasis on physical looks 
At least until the terrorist attacks on the U.S. in 2001, Japanese in general hardly had any opinions 
on Muslims as a group.382 When judging foreigners from Islamic countries, religious factors are in 
Japan often considered less interesting than factors such as nationality, race and physical looks. 
Penn argues that Muslims as a group face no more problems than the average foreigner in Japan, 
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but that they as individuals may face more problems based on their looks. He cites dark skin and 
beard as physical characteristics that are not perceived well in Japan, and the hijab as the 
corresponding negatively received physical characteristic for women, as it is often associated with 
backwards oppression of women.383 Onishi argues that because most Muslims workers in Japan 
stand out physically and culturally,  their everyday life is very different, and “probably more 
difficult” than the lives of foreign workers whose looks are closer to the Japanese’s.384 Associating 
Muslims with beards seems to be a widespread image: a survey among high school students 
indicated that their image of Islam was a religion practiced by bearded men living in desert areas.385 
Penn’s comments about Muslims’ beard being a physical characteristic not well received in Japan 
can be traced back to deep-rooted Japanese perceptions of extensive facial hair being ‘barbaric’.
 The concept of barbarians in Japan can be traced back to the substantial import of Chinese 
concepts between the sixth and eighth century. In China, the popular image of barbarians has 
traditionally been hairy beings with uncivilised and primitive ways.386 Early Chinese accounts of a 
breed of hairy people in Japan might possibly be a mention of the ainu people of Japan’s 
northernmost island Hokkaido, who were eventually to be regarded as Japan’s barbarians.387 Early 
1300s Japanese accounts of ‘foreign’ barbarians in Japan’s frontiers described them as hairy, 
growing hair all over their bodies.388 Similarly, 1500s accounts by Japanese describe the land “to 
the north of Japan” as “inhabited by huge, bearded natives”.389 1700s accounts still emphasised 
their hairy looks, one stating that “[t]heir bodies are most hairy and their eyebrows a single line; 
some even grow body hair like bears”.390 The ainu were frowned upon because of their facial hair, 
and in the periods the shogunate would enforce Japanization on them and have their beards shaven, 
often forcibly 391. Today, extensive facial or body hair is arguably still a sign of backwardness. In my 
next section on images of Muslim immigrants, I will further elaborate on the interesting history of 
relation between the Japanese mainstream and the ainu minority.
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5.6 Image of Muslims VI - the entertainingly different 
curiosity on TV
In Onishi’s qualitative research on Muslim workers in Japan, she in several interviews found that 
respondents emphasized how they are not really that different from Japanese. Stressing how they 
also have started to like food like misō soup, raw fish and nattō (fermented beans), they requested 
social acceptance, claiming they were “almost like the Japanese”.392 Indeed, as a foreign minority 
individuals grow accustomed to their new surroundings, they will often initially feel that the gap 
between their culture and that of the host society, which they may or may not have felt before, is 
decreasing. For some Muslim immigrants, it may be frustrating when mainstream society do not 
share their view, and in some instances not only deny their similarity, but over-emphasize aspects of 
them that are different. Or, in the Japanese case I will demonstrate next, even invent new 
characteristics of ‘otherness’.
Over-emphasis on ’otherness’: Representations of foreigners in television shows
In talk shows, comedy shows, documentary and ‘reality’ type shows on Japanese TV, foreigners 
living in Japan is a curiosity often exploited for entertainment. While this is hardly unique to Japan 
- the different foreigner is a source of comedy on television in the US and Europe as well - there are 
certain peculiar features of these TV shows that makes them worthy of a closer look. While many of 
these representations of foreigners are fairly accurate and respectful, there are also many instances 
of completely misleading representations – often in the cases where the foreigner is not exotic or 
different enough to be entertaining. In those cases, ‘otherness’ is increased by exaggerating - or 
even inventing completely new - cultural features.
 In this [http://bit.ly/gcbHKo] 2008 clip from the late-night comedy show Mayobra-ha, two 
comedians visit the international dormitory Osaka English House, where young students and 
workers, foreign as well as Japanese nationals, live alongside each other. The comedians come up 
with an entertaining challenge to get the most value out of their visit – a challenge to eat 
‘disgusting’ foreign food. The foreigners are forced to eat the most shocking Japanese food the 
comedians can come up with: umeboshi (pickled plums) and nattō. These are indeed known to be 
unpopular among first-time visitors to Japan, i.e. tourists, but it’s quite rare for foreigners living in 
Japan for extended periods to not become accustomed to such common foods. It’s safe to say that 
the majority of long-time exchange students and English teachers in Japan find these dishes quite 
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ordinary. The Mayobra-ha team here display the typical Japanese tendency of perceiving foreigners 
as temporary guests unaccustomed to Japan.
In return, the Japanese comedians are to eat disgusting food from the foreigners’ home 
countries – notably a Swedish girl’s surstrømming (sour-tasting canned fish with a distinct smell) 
and a Canadian boy’s spaghetti with maple syrup - a dish that does not exist. It’s apparent that an 
exotic and extreme dish is invented by the TV producers due to none of the other residents having 
any exciting local food that could match the Swedish girl’s surstrømming. The Japanese comedians 
scream with comical exaggeration about the stench of the surstrømming, and then next – not 
surprisingly – complain about the disgusting combination of maple syrup and spaghetti. I later had 
the opportunity to talk to the two Canadians who appeared in this show, and they both with a smile 
on their face confirmed to me that there most definitely does not exist any such dish in Canada393.
 Another example of shows that exaggerate foreigners’ differentness is Koko ga hen da yo 
Nihonjin (“Japanese people: this is odd!”), which ran from 1998 to 2002. In this show, TV stars 
Takeshi Kitano and Teri Ito would hold debates with a crowd of one hundred foreigners, who were 
all pointing out aspects of Japan that they supposedly found strange. The topics discussed were 
always controversial, like war, homosexuality, neo nazism etc., and consequently there was always 
a lot of screaming and verbal attacks involved. The foreigners had their national flags depicted on 
their chests, and claimed to be normal English teachers or company workers stationed in Japan, 
voicing their own private opinion. It has however since been revealed that the majority of foreigners 
appearing in the show were from the Tokyo based casting agency Inagawa Motoko Office, which 
specialises in foreign ‘talents’.394 In other words, they were performers, and few of them were 
actually working in Japan and participating in Japanese society in a normal manner. With the 
extreme opinions many of these foreigners were staged to utter, while dressed in clothes displaying 
the national flag of their home country, they undoubtedly generated prejudices against foreigners, 
and spread exaggerated stereotypes.
 The hit TV show Karakuri TV, hosted by Sanma Akashiya, which runs in prime time395 on 
Saturdays, has through the years had several regular features with foreigners as an invaluable 
elements of entertainment. In one past feature, called KARAKURI FUNNIEST JAPANESE, foreigner 
celebrity Thane Camus asked questions to foreigners in English, which they in turn had to answer in 
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Japanese. The entertainment value and humour stemmed from, as the name makes so explicit, how 
funny these foreigners’ Japanese language mistakes were.
 The foreigners were ridiculed for their failed attempts at imitating something reserved for 
Japanese - speaking the Japanese language. This fits into nihonjin-ron’s idea of Japanese as an 
unlearnable language, exclusive to the Japanese people. The show has been subject to criticism, as 
it is suspected for staging many of these funny so-called mistakes. Nigerian Bobby Ologun, who 
started regularly appearing in FUNNIEST JAPANESE, became famous through his hilarious 
mistakes. A major celebrity in Japan today, his rise to fame was due to mistakes such as confusing 
the word tensai (“genius”) with the word hentai (“pervert”). The show, and Bobby himself, 
eventually became criticised for staging his so-called mistakes. Bobby was exotified by the show, 
and also exaggerated his own difference, by doing more foreigner mistakes than were natural or 
convincing. In a 2009 quiz show where Bobby starred as a guest, viewers were allowed to vote on 
different aspects of Bobby’s life via phone. On the question of “does Bobby intentionally make 
mistakes when speaking Japanese?”, as many as 90 % of callers voted yes.396
Why did Karakuri TV’s producers wish to exaggerate Bobby’s foreignness? And why did 
Bobby choose to play along? The easy answer to both of those questions of course is: both parties 
profited from it. But the fact that it was so profitable means that there is a big market demand for 
representations of foreigners as drastically different from Japanese. So the more complex 
underlying question is: Why is there such a big demand for representations of very ‘different’ 
foreigners in Japan? As stressed throughout my thesis, the combination of rapidly increasing 
kokusaika (internationalization) and restless search for a constant and ‘true’ Japanese identity (as 
opposed to ‘false’ elements) in the last decades has caused a popular climate easily leading to over-
emphasis on the ‘differentness’ of those who clearly are not part of this group - newly arrived 
foreigners.
As not only the uniqueness, but also the ‘sameness’ of the Japanese continues to be 
emphasized in Japanese culture discourse (and through nihonjin-ron), foreigners are simultaneously 
and consequentially emphasised as very different from Japanese. This way, a simplified ‘us’ is 
created through the contrast to a simplified ‘them’. Exaggerated exotification of foreigners, and the 
artificial widening of the ‘cultural gap’ between Japanese and foreigners when contrasting them, is a 
tool of cultural nationalism, and continues to be a contributing factor to the fear of cultural masatsu 
(friction), and thus a major obstacle to increased acceptance for immigrants in Japan. Especially in 
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the media of Japan, there seems to be a tendency of exaggerating the ‘differentness’ of foreigners: 
When contrasted to ‘the Japanese’, the aspects of the foreigner that make her or him different are 
over-emphasised, and new parameters of difference might even be freely invented.
One can argue that over-emphasis on differences between different cultures or nations that 
we can find in shows such as Mayobra-ha, Koko ga hen da yo Nihonjin and Karakuri TV originate 
from a Japanese fascination with ‘the other’ that has long roots, and it will surely take time to 
abolish the exotified and romanticised ideas of the ‘other’, or the foreign, that these shows know to 
exploit. These TV shows emphasise foreigners’ differentness, and contrasts them to mainstream 
society’s culture, in a way that makes it hard for them to find acceptance in, and inclusion into, 
mainstream society. Looking back at the Tokugawa Period’s views on the ‘otherness’ of non-
Japanese, one can notice an interesting similarity in the exaggeration of the difference of 
‘foreigners’, and the way this was explicitly used to exclude them from society, but also an 
interesting trend of sometimes halting this emphasis on difference and rather encourage complete 
assimilation, if this was in the political elite’s interest.
The Tokugawa Period’s ka-i beliefs
When the Japanese’s worldview was still heavily influenced by and similar to China, their view of 
modernity had a spacial perspective of core and periphery. In the 1700s, the system of beliefs called 
ka-i exaggerated ‘foreign’ groups for political ends.397 Ka-i means China-barbarians, and it 
encompasses a dichotomised distinction between the civilised Self and the barbarian Other398. After 
adopting a worldview inclued by the West’s, emphasis shifted away from spacial distance and 
towards emphasis on time: The less modern peoples were seen as lagging behind in time after 
modernized peoples such as the Japanese, in an evolutionist inspired philosophy. In the period of 
ka-i, the core of Japan, the Wajin (“Japanese Persons”), saw the northern frontier and its ainu 
people, as well as the Ryukyu Kingdom to the south, and its ryukyu people, as peripheries settled by 
‘foreigners’. The nomadic ainu people were considered “barbarians”.399 The Matsumae clan was, 
starting with the end of the 1500s and all the way until Japan’s official annexation of Hokkaido in 
the Meiji Period, the clan of wajin who had the most formal contact with the ainu, being the clan 
assigned to reign over the southernmost part of Hokkaido.
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  Under these conditions, the peripheral ainu were constantly subject to various shifting policies 
directed either from the Matsumae clan or from the shogunate in Honshu, the core of wajin power. 
In periods, the latter wanted to impose forced assimilation upon the ainu, as part of a strategy to 
mobilise them as allies against Russia.400 As the Russian threat ended, however, policy shifted to the 
complete opposite401: The ainu, who had been forcibly Japanized, were suddenly forbidden to learn 
the Japanese language, and to wear characteristically Japanese clothing such as straw sandals and 
straw raincoats402, and were also discouraged from taking up farming. Although they did speak 
entirely different languages and indeed had rather different traditions, customs and lifestyles as 
well, their Otherness was clearly exaggerated, and they were denied assimilation or integration into 
Japan, or attempts at imitating the Japanese way. Morris-Suzuki describes this policy as 
“magnifying the exotic character of the peripheral societies”, as the relationships with the ainu and 
Ryukyu “represented the subordination of foreign people to Japanese domination”.403
 When Russia was perceived as a threat by the shogunate again, forced assimilation was 
introduced once more,404 showing the flexible nature of the concepts of ‘foreigner’ and ‘non-
foreigner’ in this historical period, where political agendas were a deciding factor. It has to be 
admitted, however, that it would be a stretch to suggest that the ainu as an ethnic majority went 
back and forth between being called ‘Japanese’ and ‘non-Japanese’. The truth is that they were 
never called wajin - arguably the closest concept to ‘Japanese’ that existed at the time - but merely 
“Japanised natives”.405 There was still a notion of them essentially being barbarians.
 The foreign land of Hokkaido was fully turned into a colony by Japan in 1868, the first year of 
the Meiji Restoration.406 The Ryukyu Islands and their native people experienced a similar history, 
as the Satsuma clan was assigned to rule over the islands in the late 1500s, and the islands soon 
following the beginning of the Meiji Restoration, year 1879, were formally annexed as part of the 
Empire of Japan.407 Strong and long-lasting consistent assimilation efforts of these two groups 
didn’t begin before the Meiji Period. Today, both the ainu and ryukyu people are by common sense, 
and by the homogenity ideology, Japanese in every sense of the word, and together with all other 
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Japanese in other islands make up the ‘single-race’ homogeneous group called Japanese. Their 
different cultural heritage is rarely stressed by the government, but the tourism industry utilises it to 
attract visitors. The Japanese state since 2008 does admit that they are a minority group.408 
Arguably, they officially consider them a cultural minority, but not a racial or ethnic minority, as the 
image of Japan as a ‘single-race’ or ‘single-ethnicity’ nation still stands strong.
The ‘otherness’ of foreigners exaggerated in illustrations in Tokugawa
In 1640, a “Chart of All the Nations” was produced in Japan. It depicted forty different ethnic 
groups, from Southeast Asia, East Asia, Europe, along with a few representations of Americans and 
Africans, each “illustrated by a man and woman wearing national dress”.409 Morris-Suzuki, 
referring to Toby,410 describes that the period saw a wide fascination with foreigners, “stimulated by 
the arrival of the exotic Europeans”, and that this fascination took other forms as well, including 
dramas and pageants where participants “appeared dressed as ‘foreigners’ of various shapes and 
forms”.411 Traveler’s accounts of the exotic and different lands of the ainu and ryukyu people were 
also popular in this period, due to the public’s hunger for tales about the ‘different’ foreigner. In the 
illustrated books Ishū Retsuzou, released in 1790, and Ezo Seikei Zusetsu, released in 1823412, ainu 
are portrayed as exaggeratedly hairy.413 This exaggeration of the non-Japanese’s barbarian otherness 
can also be found in illustrations from the same period of Westerners, with emphasis upon long 
noses, red hair and hairiness, and the Africans and Javanese working on their ships, who were 
usually portrayed as devils.414
 One can find similarities between the fascination with foreigners, and their ‘otherness’, in the 
Tokugawa period illustrations and in the three TV shows Mayobra-ha, Koko ga hen da yo Nihonjin 
and Karakuri TV, all presenting the foreigner for display as something entertaining and exciting and 
exaggerating it. Presenting foreigners as exaggeratedly different from Japanese adds fuel to 
nihonjin-ron’s narrative of uniqueness, and cultural nationalism’s construction of a national ‘us’ 
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through emphasising the ‘us’ group’s uniqueness while exaggerating or even inventing ‘different’ 
features of the ‘others’. Once can observe clear and confusing contradictions between media’s 
exaggeration and celebration of foreigners’ ‘otherness’, and the assimilation pressure Muslim 
immigrants experience from Japanese citizens, which on the contrary requires them to eradicate 
their ‘otherness’.  The example of the Tokugawa shogunate’s shifting of policies between over-
emphasis on ‘otherness’ and assimilation pressure to demonstrate ‘sameness’ reveals how in the 
right political climate, a previously emphasised ‘otherness’ can be downplayed later.
 When foreigners in TV shows like Karakuri TV try to behave like the Japanese and speak the 
Japanese language, their attempts of ‘imitating’ Japanese is ridiculed. The combination of the belief 
of Japan being a homogeneous nation populated by one single race, and the belief that the behavior 
of foreigners, i.e. those of non-Japanese race, is drastically different, can easily lead to the belief 
that foreigners are different ‘by nature‘, and Japanese ‘by nature‘ behaving like Japanese. 
Consequentially, when foreigners transcend their foreignness and try to do things ‘the Japanese 
way’, it is perceived as a mere imitation, while when a Japanese does the same, it is rather an 
original. Nishikawa Nagao, refering to Sakaguchi415, argues that one should re-examine the 
meaning of imitation and demolish the myth of originality.416 He argues that since cultures 
constantly interact and transform, it’s meaningless to “seek pure culture or cultural identity” and 
separate cultures divided by frontiers, such as ‘Japanese culture’.417
 One respondent in Onishi’s qualitative study on foreign Muslim workers, a Pakistani who had 
stayed in Japan for almost ten years, blamed the media for Japanese not seeing him for who he 
really is. People being “uneducated” and believing what the media told them, was for him a major 
concern.418 In a political climate that encouraged and celebrated the Japanese society’s rich cultural 
and ethnic diversity, combined with an educational system that taught lessons on foreign 
minorities’ contributions and ‘belongingess’ in society from an early age on, the interest in dubious, 
exaggerative and misinforming TV shows like Mayobra-ha, Koko ga hen da yo Nihonjin and 
Karakuri TV would surely decrease.
 Similar TV shows exists in other Asian countries as well. The Korean show “Global Talk 
Show”, also known as Misuda, features a panel of foreign women residing in South Korea (usually 
foreign students) who discuss experiences in Korea, as well as issues of culture, in the Korean 
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language419. The Vietnamese show Chuyện phiếm uses the exact same concept, and an episode can 
be watched in its entirety on [http://bit.ly/euuTLT].
Bad PR
Simplified, inauthentic, staged and incorrect representation of foreigners featuring exaggerated or 
fictional cultural features, can spread misinformation at best, and at worst it can be very unfortunate 
‘PR‘ for immigrants. Such ‘bad PR’ can be held responsible for some of the marginalization of, and 
suspicion towards, foreigners that we see in Japan today. Not only media, but also politicians can be 
held accountable for the spread of ‘bad PR’: Arudou argues that while there are numerous benefits 
connected to the presence of citizens of foreign background in Japan, media and politicians have 
focused too much on irrelevant minor problems like how they “can’t sort their garbage”420, and he 
encourages the government to make clear statements about how immigration is good for Japan.
 Like touched upon by Kim earlier, it appears most Japanese do not know the reasons for, and 
realities of, migration. Conservative Japanese media might also depict foreigners as a source of 
crime and social unrest, just like the aforementioned police posters. The police at times gives the 
impression of regarding ‘internationalization’ of society as a threat to public order, talking about 
protecting citizens from crimes caused by outsiders, despite the non-existence of statistics 
indicating ‘outsiders’ commit more crimes than the average person in Japan. The government may 
do this as well: the MOJ in December 2010, spread fear about “serious crimes committed by foreign 
nationals”, and even suggesting it as the reason why Japan no longer is known as “the safest 
country in the world”.421 Foreigners’ rights citizen groups in Japan have combated the bad PR from 
politicians and media depicting them as criminals by writing books that expose their scapegoating 
techniques.422
 Roberts adds a different perspective: rather than focusing on the negative effects of domestic 
news stories on foreign citizens in Japan, she argues that Japanese officials’ negative tone towards 
immigration possibly can be blamed on bad PR from international news. September 11, Germany 
and France’s unrest with their migrant populations and the 2005 terror bombings in the UK are cited 
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as examples of why the Japanese government might be cautious to increase the number of migrants 
despite the rapid decline in population.423
 Either way, if the trend of inaccurate representation of foreigners does not stop, the 
consequences might become unfortunate. If this trend continues, while Japan, with its sinking birth 
rate and alarmingly shrinking working force, simultaneously increases its ‘import’ of foreign labor,  
the result could be a society with an increasing segregation between the ‘old’ citizens and the ‘new’ 
- the latter struggling to be included and to find acceptance. A shift does however not seem unlikely, 
as some positive new trends in contemporary media can be observed: In the television of recent 
years, foreigners are seen far more frequently as serious commentators on various topics such as 
sports or the news - which was rare just 5 to 10 years ago.424
 The foreigner functioning purely as an exotic curiosity or source of amusement has partly 
been replaced by the expert commentator foreigner who is taken seriously while he is speaking 
fluent Japanese. A pioneer in this trend has been the UK-born, Australia-raised Japanese citizen 
Gregory Clark.425 Not only has he been a regular columnist since 1980 for written publications such 
as the International Herald Tribune, Nikkei Business, Nikkei Weekly, Mainichi Daily, Toyo Keizai, 
Tokyo Business Today and Japan Times, but he has also since 1986 made regular TV appearances 
on the NHK show Shiten Ronten (“Points of View”).426 This gives hope for respectful 
representations of foreign residents in Japanese media, and it will be interesting to follow further 
developments. Another recent development that brings hope for the future is Japan’s increasing 
interest in multiculturalism, which I will make a brief account of in the following chapter.
6. Multiculturalism
6.1 Towards multiculturalism
The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in 2005 launched a study group on the 
promotion of multiculturalism, which in 2007 released a report suggesting that a tabunka kyōsei 
shakai, “Society of Multicultural Coexistence”, should be developed through the efforts of local 
governments. The report focused on the overcoming of cultural and linguistic barriers between 
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ethnic groups without assistance from the central government.427 However, in order to truly 
improve the current situation of immigrants, as well as prepare Japan for a future increase in 
immigrants, I propose developing national-level policies promoting multiculturalism. Political 
multiculturalism is intrinsically linked to the welfare state, and should thus be considered the task of 
the central government.
 This does not seem unlikely to happen within the foreseeable future: Decision makers both 
within Japanese politics and economy are currently observing immigration topics in the West, and 
studying “best practice examples” as well as problematic experiences with migration, in European 
countries such as Germany and France, as well as countries like Canada.428 I believe that the 
continued pursuit of multiculturalism policies is the best move for Japan and its future, for reasons I 
will elaborate on in my next and final chapter. Before moving on, however, I will discuss some of 
the potential challenges the introduction multiculturalism could face, and why it may not 
necessarily always fruitful to compare Japan to the West when discussing multiculturalism.
6.2 Japan’s mixture of cultures
Cultures constantly interact and transform. The mainstream culture of Japan, like that of all 
societies not completely isolated, includes a wide range of formerly exogenous elements from a 
number of different sources: The Japanese dish tempura originally stems from Portugal,429 Japanese 
green tea (often called nihoncha, “Japanese tea”) was originally introduced from China, Buddhist 
values were spread to Japan from the Indian continent, the regular Japanese TV viewer watches not 
just Japan-produced shows, but also shows imported from countries such as South Korea and the 
US, the Japanese language is written in the Chinese alphabet Kanji and two syllabus alphabets, 
Katakana and Hiragana, that in their looks deviate from Kanji - the list goes on.
 Of course, it is not an easy task to make this point to a multiculturalism-sceptic Japanese 
nationalist: In the discourse of cultural nationalism, the past is represented in a way that gives the 
impression of a historic cultural consistency and continuity within the nation’s borders, and 
concepts that are actually foreign are incorporated into this discourse as unique to the nation, their 
exogenous nature censored. During the 2005 opening ceremony of the Kyushu National Museum, 
which displays the influences from countries such as China and Korea on Japanese cultural 
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heritage, Taro Aso praised Japan for having "one culture, one civilization, one language, and one 
ethnic group," and stated that it was the only such country in the world430.
6.3 Multiculturalism and rights in an East Asian nation
It may appear easy to compare the situation of multiculturalism in Japan to that of Europe, as 
nations like Italy and Germany also for long stretches of history held an image of themselves as 
more or less ethnically ‘homogeneous’, and only relatively recently started accepting foreign 
newcomers. Martellone, discussing attitudes towards immigrants in Italy, argues that old residents 
are containing their negative feelings towards newcomers since the country fairly recently 
experienced the horrors of World War Two, and thus has a “deep seated revulsion against any form 
of racism”, and “being a very young democracy, has matured rapidly a strong sense that civil rights 
and basic social rights belong to all”.431 Comparing Italy to Japan, they do have much in common 
besides being relatively ethnically homogenous until recently: Both are important world powers and 
young democracies, both were Axis powers in World War Two, and the two are experiencing similar 
demographic problems urging immigration: low birth rate and greying of society.
 However, one major difference is that Japan has not processed its former role as an Axis 
power in the same way, possibly indicating historical and regional differences between European 
and East Asian nations that cannot be ignored. One must also not forget that while post-war Europe 
experienced an influx of former colonial subjects as a consequence of the dissolution of colonies, 
Japan rather chose to shut former colonial subjects out. Further comparing to Martellone’s 
description of Italy, Japan arguably has not developed any deep resentment against racism, nor any 
widespread beliefs in equal social and civil rights for all. On the contrary, Japan’s legal system 
arguably systematically differentiates between different groups of people, assigning them different 
rights and presupposing they have different roles to play in society.
 Shipper argues that Japan’s immigration policy categorizes foreigners “hierarchically by race 
(or nationality), their function in Japanese society, and, sometimes, gender”, and that the 
construction of such policies on behalf of the government is “rooted in a cultural view that certain 
races and nationalities are uniquely qualified for certain kinds of labor”.432 In what he calls a “racial 
hierarchy”, he views zainichi and nikkeijin as on top, considering their better jobs, salaries and 
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working conditions compared to other foreign workers. He regards South Asians to be on the 
bottom, considering their “low-skill jobs, poor pay, and dangerous working environments”.433 
Demonstrating the Japanese government’s hierarchical sorting, Shipper points to the difference 
from group to group in immigration control laws and integration policies, like the government only 
targeting inclusion policies towards one specific foreign group, nikkeijin. The government 
prioritizes skilled migrants, and while nikkeijin and zainichi are allowed to do unskilled work, 
others are left to be trainees or pushed into the marginalized category of ‘illegal’ worker.434 
 Indeed, the vast variety of types of immigration statuses in Japan may indicate that a belief in 
equal social rights and civil rights for all has yet to manifest itself in the country. Another indicator 
is the lack of a law against racial discrimination. In a regional perspective, however, Japan is hardly 
unique in this regard, as no such law exists in any East Asian country. South Korea, despite being 
host to an ever-growing foreign population much like Japan, is yet to introduce policies to actively 
protect these new citizens. Many liberals and activists in South Korea are advocating the 
introduction of a such law, but like in Japan it is yet to become a part of mainstream discourse, 
conservatives having little interest in the subject.435 Nevertheless, in 2009 a South Korean was fined 
in the first racial insult case of the country, for shouting discriminatory remarks to an Indian 
national.436 This should be regarded as an important development in East Asia racial discrimination 
debate.
 If Japan or Korea were to become the first East Asian country to introduce laws against racial 
discrimination, they could become important role models for the securement of human rights in the 
region. Either way, the trainee system and nikkeijin-friendly revised Immigration Law that Shipper 
criticizes were introduced in 1981 and 1990, respectively. While Japan may not have developed the 
same anti-racism and pro-egalitarianism sentiments in the aftermath of World War Two as Europe 
did, the country has nonetheless gone through sweeping social changes and continued development 
in the decades since the introduction of these two policies, and I argue that the time is ready to 
revise these policies, as well as clean up their lasting negative aftereffects.
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7. Conclusions
If we look at the situation of Japan’s current tangibly different immigrants, and the difficulties and 
challenges they are experiencing, through the case of Muslim immigrants, what observations can be 
made that could potentially help improve their current situation, as well as prepare Japan for a 
future increase in immigrants? What possible underlying reasons for these difficulties and 
challenges can be found?
7.1 Increased immigration, from an increasing number of 
countries
Japans’s current official immigration politics seem to imagine that only skilled immigrants will 
enter the country, and only temporarily. Japanese may frequently liken the situation of foreigners in 
Japan with their own situation when traveling abroad, and like the “March in March” activists point 
out, Japan currently hires foreigners in a ‘use and discard’ fashion (see section 3.3). Due to the rapid 
greying of society, this line of politics is turning obsolete. All indications point toward that Japan is 
currently on the verge of turning to increased immigration as a counter-measure to such 
demographic problems as kōreika og shōshika. The remarkable speed of Japan’s population decline 
is due to the three main factors of low birth rate, low migration flow and high life expectancy.
 Economic disadvantages to these demographic trends include shrinking consumer markets, 
as well as cheap labor dependent small- and medium-sized businesses struggling to survive. No 
industrial nations seem able to drastically turn the birth rate around, so Japan is forced to turn to 
labor migration the same way others are. While Japan’s politicians have been reluctant to make this 
increasingly unavoidable move, they have been subject to pressure from powerful actors such as the 
UN, in their 2000 ‘wake-up call’ report, as well as the Nippon Keidanren, also urging increased 
immigration in several reports. Japan’s population constantly grew from 1870 to its peak in 2005, 
but has been declining for the past five years. It appears plausible that it only well be a matter of 
time until Japan’s politicians take action.
 Scholars as well as MOJ reports are indicating that Japan’s foreign population will not only 
grow, but also will continue to diversify. Japan has throughout its post-war history attempted to rely  
on importing ‘its own’ as labor migrants, first through rural migrants in the immediate post-war 
decades, then through nikkeijin since the revision of the Immigration Law in 1990. They are 
however running out of immigrants of Japanese ethnicity to import.
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 Japan has however only per official policy restricted its labor immigration to ‘ethnic 
Japanese’. In reality, Japan has in the last decades seen de jura immigration of ethnic Japanese 
happening at the same time as substantial de facto immigration of foreigners from a diverse number 
of countries, including the ones from Islamic countries discussed in my thesis. The fact that Japan 
has become dependent on far more immigrants than just those of Japanese ethnicity is evident when 
one considers the facts that the country annually imports approximately 90,000 ‘trainees’, and that 
the number of ‘illegal’ immigrants in Japan counted 78,488 ‘in January 2011. ‘Oldcomers’ came to 
Japan for historic, ethnic and/or economic reasons, either voluntarily or involuntarily. The 
‘newcomer’ group nikkeijin came for the same reasons, but voluntarily. All other immigrant groups 
immigrate to Japan voluntarily and mainly for economic reasons, and it is likely this also will be the 
case for future immigrants.
7.2 Japan’s foreign Muslims today
Japan’s current foreign Muslim population counts around 60,000 people, and the four biggest 
nationalities are Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran. Foreign Muslims in Japan are predominantly  
male, and few of them naturalize. They mostly arrived in the late 1980s and early 90s, entering as 
‘trainees’ or via waiver programs that since have been discontinued. Many overstayed their visas 
and became undocumented workers, but in recent years many have left this ‘illegal’ status, marrying 
Japanese nationals. Upon marriage, many have firmly settled down in Japan, becoming self-
employed businessmen and forming families. The second generation is still very young, usually not 
even teenagers. The trend of settling down has led to an increase in Muslim prayer facilities and 
associations: While Japan’s mosques counted only 20 in 2006, the number had grown to 60 in 2010.
 Those still ‘illegal’ have in some cases appealed to the immigration office and Supreme 
court pledging not be deported. Various activist groups are advocating the rights of legal as well as 
‘illegal’ immigrants. While a considerable portion of the foreign Muslim population is getting 
increasingly settled down in Japan, many Muslim foreign workers have been observed to develop 
stronger Muslim identity or faith after living in Japan for a while. This can be interpreted as part of 
a trend of ‘giving up’ on acceptance and inclusion into Japanese society. Other indications of this 
trend include cases of Muslim parents sending their second-generation immigrant children back to 
the Islamic World for school. The government in 2004 approved the first multilingual nikkeijin 
school, but it seems unlikely that Islamic schools will become common in the foreseeable future. 
Nevertheless, Japanese Muslims show no sign of developing strong Long-Distance Nationalism or 
of radicalizing, and should constitute no threat of terrorism.
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 Muslim ‘trainees’ are today working in difficult conditions, but their situation seems to be 
improving. Official ‘trainees’ have since recently been protected by labor laws, and increasing focus 
seems to be put on their rights. The government is through its recent measures to improve the 
working conditions of ‘trainees’ as laborers arguably starting to admit to the trainee program being 
an official unskilled labor migration scheme. It appears likely that the program will be subject to 
further changes soon, and possibly even be replaced by a different immigration program.
7.3 Japan’s Muslim foreign minority compared to other 
foreign minorities in Japan, as well as Muslim minorities in 
Europe
Tangibly different immigrants like Muslim foreign workers have to face problems that were less of 
a concern to ‘oldcomer’ immigrants: For example, they may due to their looks be discriminated 
against, or be recognized as foreigners in public when this is undesirable. ‘Newcomers’ also differ 
from ‘oldcomers’ in how different the possibilities of transport and communication are for the 
former compared to what they were like at the time of the latter’s arrival in Japan. Due to 
developments in transport, e.g. jet air travel allowing frequent travels back home, as well as 
communication, e.g. technology such as the Internet, today’s immigrants have far greater 
possibilities for developing transnational identities or Long-Distance Nationalism.
 ‘Oldcomers’ broke their ties to their former home country in a much more rigid fashion 
when settling down in a new country, and have through the course of several generations become 
relatively assimilated into Japanese society. Because their time of arrival is so different, it is 
unlikely that ‘newcomer’ foreigners will assimilate to the same degree, even if given the same 
number of generations. Either way, to what degree they will be able to ‘blend into’ Japanese society 
will be dependent on the degree to which the Japanese state structurally assimilates them.
 When attempting to explain conflicts between Muslim immigrants and their European host 
societies, many point to the historic dichotomy between the Islamic World and Europe. There has 
never existed a corresponding dichotomy between Japan and the Islamic World. The two had ties on 
a spiritual and political level through the Pan-Asian and Pan-Islamic movements, and were arguably 
in the first half of the 20th century considering themselves allies in a world order where the 
dichotomy from their perspective laid between the Oppressive West and the threatened East.
 Like the rest of Asia, the Islamic World looked up to Japan’s successful modernization and 
victory in the Russo-Japanese War. Anti-Western activists from various countries, including Muslim 
exiles, gathered in Japan and its occupied territories in this period. Some negative images of Islam 
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did exist in Japan in this period, as Japan’s knowledge of the Islamic World had been mainly based 
on European sources ever since the 1600s. But the Islamic World had a much more positive view of 
Japan than it had on the West, and arguably this is to some degree still the case. With the exception 
of Indonesia, Japan does not have an imperialist past in the Islamic World. Former Japanese Prime 
Minister Taro Aso has directly contrasted this to the West’s relationship to the Islamic World, and 
argued Muslims still have more trust in Japanese than in Westerners.
 The situation changed after 1945, as Muslim exiles in Japan returned home when they didn’t 
fit into the new ‘single-race’ Japan. Japan’s current foreign Muslim minority is a relatively new 
group, who didn’t arrive until the 1980s. This also makes them different to the Muslim foreign 
minority groups in Europe, whose origins often reach back to the 1950s. Besides being a newer 
group, Japan’s Muslim minority also differs from those in Europe in that it consists of no refugees, 
as Japan usually does not accept any. Another difference is that while the first worker immigrants in 
countries like the UK and France were former colonial subjects, Japan’s foreign Muslim population 
does not consist of any immigrants who gained access to its labor market through prior status as 
colonial subjects, as Japan developed ‘amnesia’ about its imperialist past. Although Indonesia was 
occupied by Japan from 1942 to 1945, and Indonesians are the most populous Muslim nationality in 
Japan, current Indonesians did not arrive through any privilege policies.
 When discussing immigrants from countries such as Pakistan, European immigration 
discourse usually places great emphasis on these immigrants’ religious affiliation to Islam, but 
Japanese are in general less interested in this parameter, and tend to focus more on grouping people 
according to physical characteristics. While Muslim’s negatively perceived cultural practices, such 
as for example the practice of wearing hijab, in Europe may be blamed on the religion of Islam and 
be considered in conflict with ‘European values’ or ‘Christian values’, in Japan they are rather 
labeled as ‘foreign‘ cultural practices, and considered in conflict with values of ‘modernity’. Europe 
and Japan dealt with the aftermath of the Second World War in different ways. While it in Europe 
after the war started to become taboo-ridden to speak of the world’s cultures in an evolutionist way, 
and social darwinian and universalist ideas in public discourse were replaced by relativist ideas 
about the equal value and nonlinear development of all cultures, the same did not happen in 
Japanese public discourse.
 In Europe, the same underlying ideas arguably dominate, but they are re-branded in a the 
contemporary accepted terminology: objectionable Muslim values are not ‘un-modern’, or ‘lagging 
behind’ in time, but rather ‘un-Christian’, or ‘un-European’. In Japan, this shift never happened in 
the same way, so Japanese may be more comfortable describing objectionable Muslim values as 
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lacking ‘modernity’. The positive side effects of this for Japan’s muslim immigrants is that while 
the terminology in European discourse may suggest an incompatibility of ‘European values’ and a 
static religion of Islam that will not resolve by the passage of time, Japanese discourse does not 
indicate any incompatibility in this way, and may in a carefree manner expect the certain ‘third-
world’ or ‘unmodern’ cultural practices by their new citizens to eventually vanish as they live their 
lives in the modern and advanced civilization of Japan. Arguably, some may also in Europe claim 
Islamic culture is ‘backwards’, and criticize it of lacking the cultural modernity that Europe 
acquired through the renaissance. But generally, emphasis on Muslim ‘un-modernity’ is much more 
prevalent in Japanese discourse than in European.
  Also, although a recent reinforcement of the ‘terrorist image’ has been seen in the Japanese 
news stories on leaked police documents, Muslim foreigners in Japan do not really have a 
‘terrorist’ image the way they do in Europe. Japan’s demonized ‘terrorist’ minority is rather the 
North Korea-affiliated zainichi. The instances of terrorism suspicions one has seen have arguably 
been projected to Japan’s Muslim immigrants through the US. In conclusion, one can say that the 
way immigrants from Islamic countries are perceived in Japan differs sharply from the way they’re 
perceived in Western Europe: two of the most common associations linked to them in Western 
Europe, ‘Muslim’ and ‘terrorist’, are both uncommon in Japan.
 The discovery of these historically rooted differences between Western European nations 
and Japan as hosts societies for Muslim immigrants suggests a context-sensitive approach might be 
desirable for the future development of multiculturalism- and minority-oriented policies in East 
Asian nations, rather than merely learning from Europe’s experience with the same group.
7.4 Problems foreign Muslims are experiencing in Japan today
As a foreign and ‘racial’ minority, Muslims in Japan are facing typical problems like discrimination, 
racism, misconceptions, stereotypes and prejudice, as well as problems common to blue-collar 
foreign workers. Like other immigrants in Japan, they suffer from a gap in immigration policy and 
reality: the MOJ claims immigrants are generally in Japan on a temporary basis, and only have 
access to high-skilled segments of the labor market, but in reality Japan has a substantial number of 
unskilled worker immigrants, who are becoming increasingly settled down. The Japanese tendency 
of looking at anything foreign as temporary, and in a situation of being a mere ‘guest’ does not 
make life in the country easy for those foreign Muslims who have settled permanently.
 The government insisting on the official image of Japan as a country not accepting unskilled 
workers, which simply does not match with reality, eventually leads to unskilled workers being 
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pushed into the marginal status of ‘illegal’, or undocumented, worker. Life as an ‘illegal’ is difficult: 
Although ‘illegals’ typically do unpopular and risk-filled ‘3K’ work, they are due to their illegal 
status not protected by law nor insurance. Foreign Muslim ‘illegals’ also have to fear detection and 
deportation at all times due to their easily recognizable looks, and can thus not walk carefree in 
public. Other problems they experience as tangibly different foreigners in Japan include negative 
judgments of characteristics such as dark skin, beards or hijabs. Work problems specific to Muslims 
can include being denied requests to do lighter work during the Ramadan or require multiple breaks 
for prayer (take many breaks) at work. Some have even been fired for these reasons.
 At the workplace and elsewhere, foreign Muslims may struggle with assimilation pressure. 
This pressure can in Japan, like in certain European nations, mean an unrealistic expectancy of 
rapid intragenerational assimilation, which can be contrasted to the classic US model of slower 
intergenerational assimilation. While they this way are expected to behave like Japanese, they at the 
same time often are emphasized as overly different from Japanese. These contradictory messages 
can be confusing, and a cause for frustration. Muslim immigrants may after living in Japan for 
extended periods feel that the gap between their culture and that of the host society is decreasing, 
but mainstream society seems to disagree, and their ‘otherness’ is often over-emphasized, and new 
characteristics of 'otherness' might even be invented.
 Foreign Muslims have expressed concerns about feeling isolated, and not as true members 
of Japanese society. Failure to include immigrants into society has led to ghettofication in some 
areas, like the city of Hamamatsu, where Japanese and foreign nationals live separated, and second-
generation immigrants, to whom education currently is not compulsory, have poor Japanese 
language skills and drop out of school. Muslim immigrants may also struggle with a Japanese meta-
narrative of homogeneity, which labels them as outsiders. Central to this labeling lays the claims of 
a ‘single-ethnicity’ Japan, which can come from all sorts of politicians and officials, including those 
easily labeled as nationalist right-wing conservatives, like Nakasone, but also immigration-friendly 
bureaucrats like Sakanaka. Immigrant Muslims in Japan, being a marginalized group, lack strong 
and visible voices in society to negotiate their image. Unable to communicate what they perceive as 
a correct image of themselves, they consider themselves misunderstood, feeling mainstream society 
does not understand what life for a Muslim is like, or that the images most people have of  them, 
mostly derived from media, are unbalanced.
 Negative and unbalanced images are manifold. In regards to religion, Islam may be 
perceived as a ‘third-world religion’, in contrast to Christianity and its connotations of modernity. 
In regards to culture, Japanese may hold images of the cultures of Islamic countries being less 
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complex and ‘civilized’ than those of Japan, images that to a certain degree can be traced back to 
the Meiji elite’s view of the Western and Islamic civilizations during Japan’s modernization process. 
Other negative images can, among other things, include prejudices about foreigners being ‘illegals’ 
or criminals. Unfortunate images are often spread by media, like television shows presenting 
simplified, inauthentic, staged and/or incorrect representation of foreigners featuring exaggerated or 
fictional cultural features, which potentially spread misinformation about, distrust for, and 
prejudices towards, immigrants.
 
7.5 Possible reasons for the problems foreign Muslims are 
experiencing in Japan today
The demography discourse of post-war Japan’s politicians has portrayed the entire Japanese 
population as culturally or racially ‘homogeneous’, creating a simplified and factually incorrect 
image. Japan was from 1945 to 2009 almost continually ruled by the conservative and nationalism-
leaning LDP. Even though traditional images of Japan have turned increasingly obsolete through 
economic development and globalization, prominent nationalist politicians have neglected these 
developments and continued to reinforce the same images. The immigration policies post-war 
Japanese politicians developed have been marked by a similar dismissal of the realities of Japan’s 
ongoing shift into a modern post-war multicultural society. When Japan’s blue collar labor shortage 
became a serious problem in the 1980s the same way it had done in Europe in earlier post-war 
decades, politicians did not begin much-needed unskilled labor immigration, but rather choose to 
hold on to the ‘homogeneous’ image of Japan, and introduced a government-endorsed ‘trainee’ 
program instead, that officially did not introduce immigrants, only temporary ‘trainees’.
 The trainee program is a guest worker program in disguise, but exactly due to being in this 
disguised form, the program leads to problems such as “slave-like” working conditions, which until 
2010 even had to be endured without labor law protection. The trainee system has until now been 
the only legal option for foreigners of non-Japanese descent wanting to work in Japan. Thus, many 
have opted for the illegal path of overstaying their visa, or entering the country illegally, and finding 
work as undocumented workers. Many who first come to Japan as trainees eventually transition to 
the status of illegal worker instead of continuing to endure the program’s harsh working conditions 
or returning home. One reason why it is so difficult for ‘illegal’ workers to improve their situation is 
that they cannot complain to public servants about labor laws or human rights being violated, 
knowing they will be reported for deportation if they do.
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 The Japanese police frequently generalizes foreigners as 'illegals' to be deported, and also 
spreads fear about crimes committed by foreigners, as well as the dangers of terrorism from Japan’s 
Muslim population. In 2010, terrorism suspicion of Muslim residents became explicit when a police 
investigation on Muslim ‘terrorism suspects’ leaked. This images of Japan’s Muslim population 
being a potential source of terrorism has no basis in reality, but is rather a suspicious image directed 
from the USA. Media and popular culture may also essentialize Muslims as 'illegals', like in the 
television series Ikebukuro West Gate Park.
 The two contradictory messages foreign Muslims face when expected to assimilate to 
Japanese culture while at the same being emphasized as drastically different from Japanese can be 
explained by two different, and in this case contradictory, streams of discourses with different 
historic origins. First, society’s expectancy of foreign Muslims discarding their original culture and 
assimilating may be explained in light of Japan’s civilization discourse, which can be traced back to 
the Meiji Period’s modernization. In this period, Japan sought to ‘catch up’ to Western civilization 
and, wanting to legitimize its claimed position as second-best, emphasized the shortcomings of non-
Western, non-Japanese civilizations. The Japanese discarded the China-influenced worldview of 
regarding variation in cultures to be due to spacial differences, and adopted a Western-influenced 
view that explained them through differences in time: less ‘civilized’ cultures were seen as ‘lagging 
behind’ in time, a way of thinking influenced by evolutionism.The unequal statuses of different 
cultures, and the unequal power relations this causes, may explain the assimilation pressure foreign 
Muslims experience.
 Focus on the ‘otherness’ of foreigners can be regarded as a legacy of Japan’s history of 
emphasizing ‘otherness’ of marginalized groups for political means, but also as a consequence of 
post-war 'homogeneity' discourse, cultural nationalism, nihonjin-ron, and the close and racialised 
link between 'ethnicity' and 'nation', as well as ideals of the state as a family. Possibly a counter-
reaction to globalization and rapid economic development, post-war Japan has been marked by a 
search for a ‘true‘ Japan, which has encompassed emphasis on the ‘uniqueness’ and ‘sameness’ of 
the Japanese people as well as over-emphasis on the ‘otherness’ of those who are not part of this 
people.
 Nihonjin-ron, the narrative of uniqueness that among other things portrays the Japanese as 
an exceptional people and considers Japan's cultural history the key to its economic success, has 
also been reinforced by foreign observers of Japan. Post-war foreign scholarly literature on Japan 
has focused on the country’s ‘unique’ aspects, and works such as Japan As Number One (1979) 
have been incorporated into the nihonjin-ron discourse. Likewise, foreign commentary on Japan 
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like the mentioned 2011 issue of Stern also reinforces the Japanese narrative of uniqueness. 
Generally speaking, these contemporary discourses and ideologies are reinforced by media and 
politicians.
 Another contradiction that Muslim immigrants may struggle with is that the public’s 
expectation of cultural assimilation is not matched by “structural assimilation” on behalf of the 
government. Until the government actively incorporates immigrants into all social arenas, including 
the educational system and the labor market, one can hardly expect these new citizens to fully blend 
into society. Additionally, immigrants in Japan appear to be facing discrimination and prejudice 
because Japanese lack knowledge and understanding about immigration, minorities and other 
cultures, and this suggests the educational system needs to be improved.
7.6 Suggested policy changes for better accommodation of 
immigrants in Japan
As Japan continues to move towards increased labor migration and a growth in its immigrant 
population, this development puts pressure on politicians to change, discard and introduce a number 
of different policies to secure the smoothness of these societal changes. First, it puts pressure on 
them to undertake a number of preventive measures to lower the risk of discrimination against 
minorities. One possible measure to attain this goal would be to alter the educational system to 
actively prevent the spread of prejudices and misconceptions about immigration, minorities and 
foreign cultures, as well as offer thorough courses on such topics as globalization and intercultural 
relations. Another would be to launch attitude campaigns directed at all segments of the population. 
Next, it also exerts pressure on officials, including the government as well as the police, to avoid 
generating such misconceptions through the use of xenophobic or essentializing discourses in 
public relations.
 Furthermore, I suggest the government should develop an honest and future-oriented 
unskilled labor migration program that differs from today’s ‘trainee’ program. If Japan wishes to 
successfully build an egalitarian multiethnic society, this new program should arguably also grant 
today’s underclass of ‘illegal’ immigrants, who tirelessly contribute to the economy through hard 
work in unpopular sectors, a legal status that would allow them to continue their indispensable work 
while feeling safe, free and protected by law. This new unskilled labor immigration program should 
instead of enforcing temporality to all rather provide a clear pathway towards legal ‘long-term 
resident’ status for those immigrants who become interested in settling down in Japan. If Japan 
while becoming increasingly dependent on a considerable numbers of new immigrants per year still 
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continues to provide the current trainee program as its only legal migration program, the country 
might very well experience that potential immigrants end up choosing other immigrant accepting 
countries, not bothering to enter a country where their working conditions are likely to be quite 
unsatisfactory, and where one has to learn a unique and challenging new language only to be forced 
home after a limited time period.
 Among the three most realistic policy approaches that state s may apply towards ethnic or 
cultural minorities; segregation, the ‘melting pot’ and multiculturalism; the latter appears best suited 
for Japan. ‘Segregation’, apart from being an ethically dubious strategy, is likely to cause significant 
radicalization and uproars among highly marginalized minority groups, while the strategy of the 
‘melting pot‘ seems unrealistic for a new emerging immigrant accepting society in the world of 
today, with the increase in trans-national identities, long-distance nationalism and further 
contemporary trends of fragmentation that modern technological advances have paved way for. 
 With that being said, Japan arguably should not expect complete cultural assimilation from 
members of new cultural groups introduced to society from this point on, but rather aim for a 
positive and peaceful co-existence of different cultural groups under some overarching values and 
norms for society. If the government actively seeks to incorporate immigrants into all social arenas, 
including the educational system, the labor market and more, these new citizens are likely to 
develop positive sentiments to their host society and become structurally assimilated. I will argue 
that rather than full cultural assimilation, surely these structural developments are the true 
prerequisites for a stable society without masatsu, “friction”, between different cultural groups. 
With this structure in place, immigrants would ideally be able to freely choose between cultural 
assimilation and other strategies of acculturation, like the ‘median’ option of integration.
 Further elaborating on the aforementioned need for preventive measures against 
discrimination, I argue that individual members of different cultural minority groups should not 
only be protected by the introduction of a law against racial discrimination, but also be granted a 
number of individual-level “group-differentiated rights”, like accommodation in the educational 
system and public matters such as voting, by being offered information in multiple languages, or 
other assistance that takes their unique backgrounds into consideration. Furthermore, to prevent 
future generations of Japan-born immigrants from turning into a marginalized ‘underclass’ deprived 
of social capital, it might be necessary to make the Japanese public school system compulsory for 
all citizens regardless of nationality, and also to introduce policies for better accommodation of 
immigrant schoolchildren, including programs such as intensive language classes for Japanese as a 
foreign language. By drawing experience from cases such as Germany, Japan should with a limited 
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number of changes be able to rework its educational system to not only better include today’s 
foreign population, but also to become much better prepared for the future. Further potential future-
oriented changes to the educational system could include reworking officially recognized history 
textbooks to paint a less subjective and ‘amnesiac’ picture of modern Japanese history. 
 It is undesirable that politicians continue uttering populist criticism of immigration and 
foreigners while they arguably in reality know that Japan is dependent on foreign workers, and will 
only become increasingly dependent in years to come. In a political climate that encouraged and 
celebrated Japanese society’s rich cultural and ethnic diversity, combined with an educational 
system that taught citizens lessons on foreign minorities’ contributions to society from an early age 
on, unbalanced images and misconceptions of immigrants would surely decrease. Furthermore, the 
demand for and and interest in dubious, exaggerative and misinforming representations of 
foreigners in TV shows, like Mayobra-ha, Koko ga hen da yo Nihonjin and Karakuri TV, would 
most likely decline.
 In order for Japan’s various cultural groups to live peacefully together in in the future, in 
healthy relationships marked by mutual understanding and respect, it would arguably be fruitful to 
decrease the over-emphasis on foreigners' 'otherness' that we see much of in Japanese society today. 
This should indeed be possible as long as there is a political will to do so. In the Tokugawa Period, 
those in power explicitly alternated back and forth between policies of exaggerating or downplaying 
the ‘otherness‘ of minorities, depending on shifting political goals. Politicians in post-war Japan 
have exaggerated the difference of ‘others’, and emphasized the ‘sameness‘ of ‘ethnic Japanese‘ for 
political goals such as increasing national unity in times of rapid development and social changes, 
as well as populist goals such as appealing to the public’s nostalgia and cultural nationalism 
sentiments. However, it should from this point on gradually become in the interest of politicians to 
advocate increased immigration, as they surely will struggle more and more with combating 
koureika and shoushika and their various related societal problems, and will meet increasing 
pressure from interest parties such as Japanese business and industry. 
 As Japan’s immigrant population grows, the government might want to take a number of 
measures to avoid an undesirable growth in the proportion of legal citizens unable to participate in 
the democratic process. First, if Japan wishes to continue special migration opportunities for ethnic 
‘returnees’, it might be good to follow the policies of countries with similar programs, like Israel 
and Germany, and grant these new citizens Japanese nationality. In order to ensure that they will 
take advantage of this opportunity, Japan could follow recent developments in South Korea and 
open up the possibility for dual citizenship. Currently, hundreds of thousands of Japan-born 
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immigrant descendants of such nationalities as Korea and China are holding on to their foreign 
nationalities while leading their entire lives in Japan, and for many of them naturalization is 
undesirable since they do not wish to forfeit their original nationality. If Japan were to fully allow 
dual citizenship, that would potentially also cause an increase in the number of Japan-born foreign 
citizens attaining Japanese nationality, thus allowing them voting rights in their home country, 
strengthening Japan’s democracy.
 Either way, Japan will arguably always have a share of citizens who do not hold Japanese 
nationality. As this part of the population is likely to only increase from this point on, the central 
government should consider following the example of the prefectures who grant local voting rights 
to foreign citizens, and turn this into a consistent nation-wide policy.
 The policies that initiated Japan’s First Wave of immigration, namely the trainee system and 
the revised Immigration Law, were introduced in 1981 and 1990 respectively. Japan has further 
developed in the years that have gone by since this, and has had sufficient time to review these 
policies and their after-effects. While the leaders of post-war Japan have applied ‘us’-strengthening 
concepts such as cultural nationalism in order to increase the legitimacy of the state, in the 21st 
century political climate of Japan several other possible approaches to build legitimacy exist, which 
should not have to conflict with the development of a more multiculturalism-oriented society. As 
China continues its economic rise, Japan could differentiate itself in the region by continuing to be a 
pioneer of democratic values like universal suffrage, multiparty rule, freedom of speech and equal 
opportunities for all citizens.
 In order to continue securing these values in a multiculturalist framework, measures such the 
introduction of a law against racial discrimination would be desirable. Such political developments 
would surely secure Japan global acclaim, and allow the country to reconfirm itself as a 
successfully modernized pioneer of democracy in the region. This would legitimize the state in a 
way that arguably is much better suited for the 21st century than the discourses of ‘racial 
homogeneity‘ and nihonjin-ron that have dominated post-war Japan. These discourses by this point 
appear to be obstacles to the development of future-oriented immigration policies, the lack of which 
is arguably holding the country back by hampering economic growth and social development.
Potential for future research
Exploring the situation of Muslims as an immigrant group in Japan should continue to produce 
interesting results. A full-fledged comparative study of the situation of Muslim immigrants in Japan 
and a Western European nation should be of high value to contemporary research on Muslims as an 
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immigrant group. Original comparative field research with Muslims immigrant respondents in both 
nations, as well as field research on the impression of Muslim immigrants among members of these 
nations’ mainstream societies, could possibly shed light on new and yet to be discussed sides of the 
muslim immigrant discourse in both societies, and challenge the status quo of current research.
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